This position, however, in no way implied that a new or different regime should be developed outside of the framework of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. On the contrary, several delegates pointed out that the Subcommittee had competence to discuss the elaboration of principles only if they were based on the Outer Space Treaty. In view of the foregoing considerations and also in light of the 'common interests' clause in the Outer Space Treaty, it might be prudent for the United States not actively to oppose but help influence the formulation of appropriate principles with respect to the geostationary orbit within the broad guidelines of the 'common interests' clause. In this connection, the key issue will be how to translate—what the ITU calls—"efficient and economic use" and "equitable access" into more specific legal and technical principles and rules relating to the use of geostationary orbit for—what the Outer iSpace Treaty calls — the "benefit and interests" of all countries. More specifically, the question will be how far is the United States willing to go in accommodating other interests which may be ready to capitalize on any opportunity arising in course of the negotiating process. The situation which may present itself is not entirely without parallel. In the law of the sea negotiations the United States had to draw a line beyond which it felt it could not go in establishing an international regime governing the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Another historical precedent worthy of recalling relates to the negotiations surrounding the Draft Moon treaty in which the
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