breakaway structures, placing of decoys of vital aim points at many places on the structure, and other countermeasures to make the SPS less vulnerable than a COMSAT. The large platform of the SPS will also allow the use of larger electronics that are more resistant to radiation such as bipolar devices for some electronics applications instead of the smaller, more vulnerable LSI semiconductor 12/ circuits.— It will also allow some of the more sensitive components to be placed beneath structure to avoid damage due to natural radiation or nuclear radiation from a weapon or test explosion. Hardening against lasers, particle beams, and missiles may be used to control damage and thus require an enemy to come within range of an SPS self-defense system. The SPS transportation system will include the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV), the Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV) and the Cargo-and Personnel-Orbital-Transfer Vehicles (COTV and POTV). The vulnerability of the personnel vehicles will be a function of vehicle hardening and lifesupport system design, whereas the vulnerability of cargo vehicles will be a function of the hardening techniques used, escort policy/capabilitv, and vehicle velocity (trip duration). For more information concerning the impact of hostile environments on the SPS, see appendix B. The rectenna site is vulnerable to ordinary ground attack but probably can be designed so that its performance degrades gracefully. Vulnerability can be reduced by placing much of the power distribution and heavy power-handling equipment underground at the rectenna site and by closely controlling design and site layout data. Care given to the security aspects of the design (controls and data handling/processing equipment) can reduce the risk of SPS equipment takeover by hostile forces. For the most part terrorist attacks will be limited to ground facilities. Attacks could be launched against the rectenna site, ground-based space transportation facilities, power distribution system, and ground-based supply lines for SPS materials and spares. Terrorist attacks against SPS space assets are conceivable but probably will not be important considerations until equipment such as high-energy laser and/or particle-beam weapons can be acquired by such groups or until earth-space transportation is commonplace. Sabotage of the system is more likely and can occur on the ground or in space. Losses due to sabotage can be controlled through internal security, employee screening, and the enforcement of harsh penalties for sabotage at SPS, utility, and support organizations.
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