ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SATELLITE POWER SYSTEMS J. Peter Vaj k Science Applications, Inc., 1811 Santa Rita Road, Pleasanton CA 94566 Satellite Power Systems (such as the SPS Reference Design currently under study by DOE and NASA) entail enormous expansions in total mass, power, logistic capabilities, and personnel in space. These expanded capabilities, far greater than for any other space programs envisaged during the next few decades, raise important questions about potential military uses of power satellites and related facilities, both on Earth and in space. Moreover, the emplacement of major economic assets vital to the economic security of a nation in outer space, beyond the territorial limits of any sovereign state, raises important questions about the vulnerability of such assets to overt military attack or to terrorist actions. Under the auspices of the DOE Concept Development and Evaluation Program, these issues were addressed in the study reported here, with a view to answering two key questions. (1) Given the widespread recognition of the expanded capabilities in space represented by any SPS deployment program, how can the public in the United States and the international community at large be assured that a civilian SPS program is not, and will not become, part of the military system of a country deploying power satellites and related system elements? (2) Given a widespread perception that space-based systems such as power satellites are very fragile, and that assets outside the territorial limits of any country are especially open to attack, can it be confidently and convincingly demonstrated that the vulnerability of SPS is no greater than, or can be readily reduced to levels comparable to, the vulnerabilities of alternative energy sources in the same timeframe (2000 to 2030, or so)? This study was performed on a totally unclassified basis, focusing attention primarily on the SPS Reference Design, but also examining some alternative system concepts where obvious differences could be expected. Certain key technologies were examined by experts in the respective fields to project reasonable levels of progress over the next twenty years or more to define the kinds of military threats which SPS could pose if military adapters of various kinds were attached to elements of the Satellite Power System. Some of the possibilities considered included particle beam weapons, high energy lasers, deliberate misdirection of the microwave power transmission beam, deliberate weather modification, electronic jamming, surveillance and reconnaissance, and various military support services, including transportation, communications, and navigation. Virtually all of these possibilities have the potential to pose significant military threats in the SPS timeframe. (Weather modification appears to be infeasible; deliberate misdirection of the microwave beam could not inflict significant damage except, perhaps, as a tool in psychological warfare.) Thus the need for safeguards to prevent such uses of SPS is real. Except for the use of space-based SPS facilities to launch reentry vehicles with nuclear warheads, none of the potential weapons systems which could be attached to SPS in the forseeable future has the capability of inflicting damage remotely approaching the extent and lethality of the present strategic arsenals of the nuclear powers. The potential for development of SPS-based directed energy weapons of sufficient range, power, and accuracy to provide a highly effective ballistic missile defense (ABM) system deserves further study.
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