Considering the vulnerability of SPS elements to espionage, sabotage, mutiny, terrorism, or overt military attack, using either conventional weapons or any of the advanced technologies considered earlier, we were lead to conclude that the SPS hardware is no more vulnerable (or can readily be designed to be no more vulnerable) than conventional power systems on Earth today. The vulnerability of SPS elements to various types of attack is highly sensitive to design details. Thus vulnerability considerations and system design for survivability must be integrated with SPS engineering design and SPS program planning from a very early stage in the program, not added on as a last minute afterthought. Detailed assessments of vulnerabilities and of hardening techniques for space systems and components is not possible on an unclassified basis, since much of the pertinent information on lethality mechanisms and hardening techniques is classified. Short of a full-scale nuclear war (in which the existing electrical grid and pipeline systems in the U.S. are just as vulnerable as the SPS), the Reference Design system does appear to be highly vulnerable to electromagnetic pulses (EMP) induced in the power satellite itself by radiation (x-rays and gamma rays) from nuclear bursts outside the Earth's atmosphere. To survive large nuclear bursts (one megaton or more) at ranges of hundreds to thousands of kilometers, extensive circuit protection and hardening against large current and potential surges would have to be designed into a photovoltaic power satellite; it is difficult to estimate the weight and cost penalties for providing this protection, but alternative SPS concepts may prove easier and cheaper. (Note that a number of nuclear powers today are not signatories to the treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear explosives in the atmosphere, under the ocean, or in outer space.) Seven key safeguards have been identified for the SPS system. These would serve to protect nations on Earth from weapon systems being added to SPS elements deployed or operated by other countries, or to protect SPS elements from attack. These safeguards, obviously, would complement the existing safeguard of deterrence. The key safeguards are: (1) an international Resident Inspection Organization, which would report to the national governments of countries participating in RIO (whether or not they participate in SPS) the presence or absence of military systems added on to SPS elements, (2) a comprehensive long-range space surveillance system, to detect threats to SPS, to identify the origin of, and (if possible) give warning of, attacks by or against SPS elements, (3) selfdefensive armaments for major elements of the SPS, (4) system design for survivability, (5) electronic countermeasures to protect SPS elements from electronic warfare attack, as well as certain types of electronic warfare equipment to assist the self-defensive armaments, (6) extensive and effective public education to correct misperceptions about SPS and about military capabilities which might be added to it, as well as to disseminate understanding about safeguards implemented in conjunction with SPS, and (7) a variety of new international agreements, including rules on permissible proximity of spacecraft to those of another country without prior consent of the other country and an unequivocal statement of the right to deploy self-defensive weapons in space. Recommendations for further studies, both on a classified basis and on an unclassified basis, have also been developed in this study. In view of the significant military potentials of SPS, the fundamental question of whether or not the United States should undertake SPS on a purely civilian basis or on a joint military/civilian basis must be addressed following more detailed assessments of issues discussed above. It appears, however, that a purely civilian SPS program could be carried out by the United States in a manner designed to assure other nations that the SPS would pose no military threat to their national security.
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