• The primary concern of nearly all national governments is the pursuit of perceived national interest rather than abstract technological concerns or concerns of international equity. • The distribution of power and influence among international actors in the specific area of satellite power technology will be more likely to determine the ultimate international legal arrangements affecting SPS than existing international legal norms and treaties-in-force. The paper provides support for theses hypotheses, based on the experiences of the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) and the World Administrative Radio Conference, and discusses their implications for the SPS concept. Specifically, the validation of these hypotheses suggests that the optimum means for achieving a favorable international climate for SPS lies in demonstrating its advantages to the national interests of the members of the international community. In effect, the success of SPS internationally will depend on how the SPS concept is "sold" outside the United States--politically as well as in scientific terms. The organizational characteristics of the ultimate agency responsible for the development and commercialization of SPS is less important. As a result of this interpretation of the issues confronting international support for SPS, the authors maintain that: • greater attention should be paid to the development of appropriate levels of SPS-related political and scientific interaction among governments and institutions that may become involved in the development and implementation of SPS; • an effort should be made to examine the alternative reactions of key national governments to various possible SPS development and implementation scenarios; and • an effort should be made to study means by which the SPS concept can be presented to the international political and economic communities (in addition to the scientific community) to achieve a favorable international reaction for SPS development and implementation, based on the perceived national interests of the key national governments. The authors note that divergent national interests can be readily identified and, potentially, reconciled, based on the experiences of negotiation on similar resource issues. For example, aside from issues affecting national defense, the Soviet Union and the European Economic Community have often been successful in preparing common positions on raw material issues, based on a common position in favor of defending regional--as opposed to global-- economic interests. Similar cooperation, based on a thorough understanding of perceived national interests, offers the best hope for international support for a U.S.-designed SPS concept.
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