interconnections, wheeling, pricing of transactions sales, and reliability assessment. Concluding, the net effect of regulatory siting procedures imposes tremendous obstacles to SPS. 4) Utility financial pressures were examined together with rate regulation of bulk power versus self-generation to evaluate utility's financial disincentives to SPS participation. Conclusions are that the evolution of the private utility industry will be largely driven by financial determinants which make large and risky capacity expansions unattractive. 5) Utility planning and operating procedures are reviewed to simulate how the SPS would be incorporated in utility long run planning, reliability and investment analysis. Conclusions are that very few potential technical/operational disincentives were identified for the integration of 5 GW increments of SPS power. 6) Building on the above review of institutional issues and ongoing structural changes, scenarios of likely industry evolution are developed, each with implications for utility involvement in SPS. Those scenarios i nclude: o Increased utility reliance on conservation, load management, and use of alternate energy sources. o Business-as-usual with utilities'continued pursuit of large nuclear and coal power plants. o Three mini-scenarios of utility involvement in SPS ranging from bulk power purchase, to rectenna ownership, to rectenna and satellite ownership. Conclusions are that institutional barriers will prevent U.S. utilities from ownership of the ground stations until the first SPS is successfully demonstrated, probably in the Tennessee Valley Authority which is the logical system in which to locate the first SPS. Ownership of ground stations and satellites by U.S. utilities would be unlikely until after some 10 such units, although the institutional barriers for U.S. utilities do not restrict state-owned utilities in other industrialized nations.
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