The SPS will have large scale sensor networks which will be monitored by a computer. The computer will be programmed to give warnings and take precautionary action in case of hazardous malfunctions. 8. 4. 3 GROUND MAINTENANCE SAFETY The rectenna field and surrounding area will be instrumented to measure the radiation levels, and a ground warning system will indicate when these rates exceed hazardous limits. These data will also be relayed to a central computer complex that has control over the beam. In case the beam exceeds the safe intensity limits within the rectenna field or outlying areas, a message will be relayed to a command point to defocus the beam. The rectenna field wall be maintained by vehicles with remote manipulator systems to remove and replace failed components. The high voltage areas will be governed by procedures that conform to the national electric code. 8. 4. 4 COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM SAFETY APPLICATIONS The communications link between the SPS and the ground receiving and distribution site will be a vital part of the overall system safety plan. A conventional two-way link will relay routine voice and data communications between the SPS and ground computers as they interpret the multiple large scale sensor networks on the transmitter array, the rectenna, and its associated safety buffer zone. It will not be necessary for the ground computer complex to have direct access to all SPS sensor network outputs nor for the SPS computers to access all ground sensor data. Each system will operate independently utilizing the developed or processed information from the other for control, status, and safety outputs. For example, one of the safety outputs would be in the form of a command to the SPS phase control system to defocus the microwave beam when intensity safety limits are exceeded. The ''command phase control" system (subsection 7. 3.6) forms a set of inputs that could result in issuance of a ''defocus" command. Critical commands of this nature rely on multiple sensors or systems that are cross-referenced and linked with time delays, where appropriate. Beam defocus will be the primary means of top level safety and could be accomplished by direct command as described or initiated by an extended interruption of monitoring capability, such as communication link failure. The large size of both SPS and the ground receiving systems will necessitate extensive monitoring, caution, and warning networks with audible and visual warnings for out of tolerance RF levels or impending shutdown conditions. Although highly automated, both systems would also call for central monitoring stations with continuous surveillance crews.
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