regions. As European space programs require geographical distribution, this would be facilitated by designing the demonstrator to have clear and well-defined interfaces so that discrete workpackages can be undertaken independently of each other. • Within the core team, or individual work package team groups, an emphasis on communications and team integration is essential. This would help to reduce the burden of paperwork that characterises most operational space programmes where traceability is important. • The management lines and responsibilities should be clearly defined. The team w'ill necessitate strong managers able to make real-time decisions on a daily basis. The demonstrator should, if possible, not be designed by the committee process and have to be subjected to periodic reviews. Much of this discussion, and especially that in the realm of management, is reminiscent of the Lockheed Corporation’s original Skunk Works philosophy used successfully on a number of U.S. aircraft programmes in the past, with the most notable example being the SR-71 which flew within 30 months of the programme's start. This Skunk Works approach has also worked in the space arena with an interesting example being the Agena upper stage, the most heavily used US upper stage. According to Kelly Johnson, the originator of the Skunk Works. [1] When I first reviewed the Agena project, I discovered that 1,206 people were employed in quality control alone, achieving only that 13 percent reliability factor! It should have been the world’s most reliable vehicle just using the inspection department. That was enough people to design and build the thing. At the Raird Atomic Company, which made the vehicle’s horizon sensor, Lockheed had 40 people inspecting, coordinating, and reporting. Yet Raird had only 35 people building the instrument. We resolved that situation by returning responsibility for the product to the vendor. For example, I
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTU5NjU0Mg==