with could have resort to jamming in the event that monetary damages were not available as compensation for the harmful intereference. At the time that the 1967 Principles Treaty was being considered by the United States Senate much concern was expressed that electronic signals could be interefered with so as to produce nonphysical but nonetheless very real detriment. It will be recalled that the Senate attached an understanding to the meaning of Article 7 of the Principles Treaty whereby it recorded its view that the Article pertained only to physical, nonelectronic damage that might be caused by space activities to the citizens or property of a signatory State. Considering the attention given to this issue by the Senate in 1967, as described above, it is quite remarkable that the printed documentation of the Committee on Foreign Relations referring to its hearings on the Liability Convention indicates that the matter went unnoticed. Before the Senate gave .its advice and consent to the Liability Convention the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences had prepared an analysis in which attention was called to the 1967 Senate position. It may be assumed that insofar as the Senate did not affirmatively modify its 1967 stand with regard to the exclusion of electronic jamming from the 1972 Convention, since it made no specific references to Article 9 of the Principles Treaty, the United States has kept the obligation of Article 9 securely in place. In specific terms this would mean that if the launching and use of a SPS, as an activity or experiment, were considered to be a potentially harmful interference with the activities of another State Executive Report No. 8, op. cit., p. 5. Staff Report, op. cit., p. 24.
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