which produced damages, that recourse could be had to the diplomatic consolations required by Article 9 of the 1967 Principles Treaty but not to the terms of the 1972 Liability Convention. Article 9 contains two major concerns. First, it draws attention to the need to protect the global environment. Second, and more specifically, it endeavors to protect the competing activities in the space environment of the space-resource States. The spatial applicability of Article 9 has been raised in connection with sensing by space objects and the prospective use of the DBS. It has been suggested that "insofar as the interpretation of consultation clauses in this context is concerned, it is submitted that potentially harmful interference with the functioning of foreign broadcasting satellites (a peaceful use of outer space) is covered by the consultation clauses." While it is clear that Article 9 establishes a firm duty to engage in consultations in the event of threatened harms, the Article does not constitute a veto over space uses or activities on the part of States. But, if a State were to refuse to carry out the obligation to consult this would undoubtedly open the door to the dispute resolving procedures contained in the Charter of the United Nations, which pursuant to Article 3 of the Principles Treaty govern the relationships of the parties to the 1967 agreement. Despite the firm duty to consult, "the formal scope of obligations under the consultation clauses of the Soace Treaty Jerzy Sztucki, "International Consultations and Space Treaties," Proceedings of the 17th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, p. 159 (1975). Compare, Istvan Herczeg, "Introductory Report, Provisions of the Space Treaties on Consultation," op. cit., p. 141. He observed that the Article 9 consultations are "extraordinary," e.g., they "are convened dependent upon definite events or contingencies."
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