in the exploration and use of the space environment. Only after there is relatively common agreement as to the validity of given facts will it be possible for the participants to move toward the legal and political considerations that will come before them. Every attempt will have to be made to avoid the early politicization of the conference. In this regard, important lessons can be learned from the lack of agreement and for the moment, at least, the lack of success of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. By comparison, the preparation that was obtained at the time of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference could be emulated. In that situation the International Law Commission was responsible for the preliminary studies and drafts of the treaties that were agreed to in 1958. For the proposed space law conference the preliminary work could be undertaken by working groups within COPUOS, and such bodies would be expected to have very substantial technical assistance from such public institutions as ITU, WHO, ICAO, IMCO, IAEA, and ESA, among others. It would also require advice and guidance from such private international bodies as COSPAR and IAF, among others. Only after such groundwork had been done would it be permissible for the national-interest positions of States to be advanced so that suitable decisions of a legal-political character might be arrived at. Since many members of the United Nations do not have a sophisticated understanding of the science and technology of the space environment, and since in many cases the LDCs are woefully understaffed when confronted by contemporaneous conferences at the UN, the use of working groups could provide a suitable educational opportunity. In the second place, it should be understood at the outset that, even assuming a firm grasp of the facts and a common political will, that
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