then such conduct would not consist in an appropriation by the using State. A using State can support such conduct by reference to the first three articles of the 1967 Treaty. It has been suggested that the underlying basis for the French position was that "a geostationary satellite occupies a definite orbital position in space and this, by any practical measure, amounts to de facto appropriation." The United States position hinges on its commitment not to appropriate orbital space. The United States distinguishes between the encouragement in the Treaty to use the space environment pursuant to Article 1, to engage in activities pursuant to Article 3, and the terms of Article 2 interdicting "appropriation by means of use." On this position Glazer has observed that "if this line of reasoning is followed, then the use of orbital space without submission to an enlarged regulatory regime is permitted provided that there is no 'intent' to appropriate the orbital space involved and the use thereof is otherwise consistent with Article 3 of the Treaty." He stated: "The French position on de facto appropriation of the geostationary orbit at least raises a real conflict since states with advanced technology do have the capability of preempting See Appendix A. Clyde E. Rankin, III, "Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit--A Need for Orbital Allocation?" 13 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 101 (1974). Compare J. Henry Glazer, "Domicile and Industry in Outer Space," 17 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 81 (1978). Ibid., p. 81. Article 3 provides "States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding."
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