the use of that orbit to the exclusion of other states.” The French position, if it were to be accepted, would require the establishment of an international body authorized to make allocations of geostationary orbital positions. This would appear to be contrary to the prohibition against national appropriations in Article 2 of the Principles Treaty insofar as such an allocation could be treated as an approval of a national claim or appropriation of a segment of the space environment. On this point Rankin has observed that "assignment of orbital slots by an international body would not be a violation of Article 2 since the article speaks in terms of '. . . national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.111 Two objections can be voiced concerning this outlook. First, no international institution exists having allocative powers with respect to orbital slots, and it is unlikely that such an institution will be formed in the near future. Second, the granting of such authority to an international body would require changes in the 1967 Treaty, which, as has been emphasized, seeks to free the space environment for peaceful and beneficial uses for States generally. The Treaty does not impose special constraints in this respect on States having an advanced scientific and technological base. Moreover, if such orbital allocations were to be forthcoming from such an international organization, although not according the claimant State a sovereign right to a given orbital area, such allocations would undoubtedly confer so much exclusivity of use that the benefiting State would be able to assert a kind of quasi-sovereignty or preferred status over the orbital slot. A priority Ibid., p. 82. Rankin, op. cit., p. 101.
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