of use, even though not permanent and not exclusive, could, with the approval of such an institution, ripen into more than a right to engage either exclusively or with other States in activities and to use. It could provide a basis for a claim of quasi-sovereign rights or preferred status which might then possibly be extended or converted to claims of sovereignty. Such an outcome would be diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the Principles Treaty. One analysis of the Principles Treaty, as it relates to the use of the geostationary orbit, bears out the foregoing assessment. Attention was given to Articles 1, 2, and 9 of the Treaty. Thus, it is noted that while the "common interests" provision of Article 1, paragraph 1, might be considered to be "vague," nonetheless it could not be construed to prevent national use of a "segment of the geostationary orbit for the purpose of satellite power generation." As previously stated, the "free use" clause of Article 1, paragragh 2, is interpreted as designed to promote space activity, even though such free use is not unlimited. Such limitations are set forth in Article 1, paragraph 1, and Articles 2, 4, and 9. Free use imposes a duty on such a user to provide benefits to the general community, but the entitlement of the general community under the language of "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries" of Article 1, paragraph 1, cannot be used to Political and Legal Implications of Developing and Operating a Satellite Power System, Final Report, Econ, Inc., Princeton, N.J., 77-195-1 (August 15, 1977). Ibid., p. 54. Article 4 imposes restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
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