5.4.1 Technology Transfer Transfer of Military Technology The investigations by the IAEA missions to Iraq stunned many of the UN officials involved in international security and disarmament. Although Iraq is a member of IAEA, and thus, bound by IAEA regulations not to develop nuclear weapons, it was revealed that Iraq was close to completing production of a hydrogen bomb. All the necessary facilities had already been constructed. This incident revealed the weakness of international regulations in controlling transfers of military technology as well as the potential danger to international security resulting from the transfer of such technology to politically unstable nations or military states. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one of two nuclear superpowers, all-out nuclear wars have become unrealistic. However, this does not mean that there is less of a chance for open military conflicts or isolated attacks. Rather, the probability of all-out nuclear war has been lowered. It is planned that the technologies developed under the ISPO will not present a significant military potential. However, transfer of technologies that might allow the recipients to increase their own military potential should be avoided at all costs. In addition, any possibility of the transfer of militarily applicable technologies, even among politically stable and non-aggressive nations, will make the situation difficult for some nations to participate in ISPO. Japan is a good example. At this time, Japan is, in principle, still against the transfer of even dual-use technologies, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Transfer of Critical Technology for Industry As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the world focus has shifted toward economic competition. Industrial competitiveness has become a crucial factor in determining national security from an economic point of view. In recent years, there has been much discussion on the correlation between technology transfer and industrial competitiveness. Especially in the United States, which is struggling to regain its industrial competitiveness, the argument of “techno-nationalism” has become prevailing. This argument was once used in the first half of 1980's to criticize Japanese industrial policies which aim to protect target industries through governmental efforts. However, in recent years, it has assumed another meaning, which is governmental efforts to protect critical technologies for industry by limiting technology transfer to other countries. Such a practice by governments is not new. However, the point here is that many nations, especially the United States, have become extremely sensitive to protecting the transfer of any technologies which might convey commercial potentials, especially in the near-term. Since initial participants of the ISPO are likely to be those nations which are already competing with each other in other areas of economic activity, regulations and arrangements for technology transfer will be crucial for the initial success of the program. Considering the fact that there are relatively high expectations among the decision-makers of the United States and European nations for economic payoffs from space spin-offs, it is not too much to say that the technology transfer issue could determine the success or failure of the program. 5.4.2 Increasing Vulnerability and Interdependency While transfer of militarily applicable technologies and commercially critical technologies can be effectively prevented for some time, there is some inevitable danger in any kind of global system, i.e., increasing interdependency among nations within the system. The space solar satellite program is expected to develop as a global system of energy production and distribution, with its facilities placed around the world and outer space. But of concern is the fact that the space solar power satellite program could become a target for terrorists. Destruction of critical facilities might cause a global panic, once the program develops to the point that it would affect most of the nations on the Earth. This part is divided into two sections. The first section examines the possible impacts of terrorism on the ISPO. The second section is concerned with the inevitable interdependency in a global system and related national security issues. Since the ISPO will provide an alternative energy source on which more and more industrial as well as social activities can be dependent in the future, the possibility that the ISPO becomes a target for terrorism cannot be ignored. In addition, social impacts of terrorist attacks on the system can be
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