Analysis of Operational Launchers The first satellite was launched 35 years ago. Then only two national launch capabilities existed. Today, many countries and companies have orbit launch capability. These organizations range from relatively small commercial corporations, as in the case of Orbital Sciences Corp, to the multinational European Space Agency. The world's launcher systems come in a variety of lift capabilities, prices, and launch terms. Getting into orbit is not a question of technology; rather, it is usually a question of cost, launch availability, and lastly, but many times the critical factor, political permission. The world's primary space-faring nations are: Russia and to a limited extent a few other former Soviet republics, the European Community in the form of the European Space Agency, the United States, Japan, and finally China. Other countries that have small space programs are Brazil, Canada, Israel, and India. In the past, national governments have been the primary providers and users of launch services. Today, providers may be a purely commercial company, a quasicommercial company owned either entirely or partially by a single government or a group of governments, or a completely governmental organization. Because of the evolution of launch vehicles, a purely commercial environment with no governmental involvement (except for launch licenses) is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. The traditional launch providers are concerned with losing market share with the entry of the Chinese and Russia into the commercial market. They comment that the Chinese and Russian vehicles are heavily subsided by their governments. These companies most likely will use all their influence to 1) keep these new providers out of the open payload markets, 2) delay their entry into the market place as long as possible, or 3) limit the damage of their entry by allowing them as few launches as possible. They have taken the last option for dealing with the new competition. The Chinese and Russians have gained entry into the market, however small. The question for the future is will the newcomers market share grow or will the established launch providers be able to hold them off with arguments of unfair government subsidies and adverse technology transfer. If the western launch providers lose their influence or the political winds change, then these new providers could gain more market share in the open launch market. Procuring a launch takes quite a bit of time and energy. There are numerous issues to be dealt with. The technical issues are fairly straight forward: find a vehicle with adequate payload capability that meets the orbital requirements, plan the integration of the payload with the rocket, etc. But, the obstacles have just begun. If you are launching on the Ariane, the back log is over 30 satellites. The shuttle takes over three years, at a minimum, to fly most payloads. Atlas and Delta launchers aren't quicker. The Chinese, with their robust stable of launchers, appear to be able to provide launches quicker but have a problem with launching US technology. The United States has allowed the Chinese to launch satellites using US technology. It is unknown whether this trend will continue. Shopping for a smaller payload launcher might offer a slight advantage in speed to launching. The small payload launchers are dominated by smaller companies. These smaller companies are eager to meet the customers' needs. Orbital Sciences' Pegasus and Taurus and International Microspace's Orbital Express are examples of vehicles that are operational or in development. Many small entrepreneurial companies are trying to enter this market. Their success at finding paying customers has been marginal; however there are some bright spots. In August 1992, International Microspace won a contract for one launch and options for nine more from the US Department of Defense Current launchers have a variety of problems that would prevent them from being used for any solar power mission other than a small scale demonstration system. These characteristics, as outlined by R.J. Hannigan in his paper “SPS Transportation Requirements: Which System? (Space Power, Volume 10), are: • high yearly operating costs from $1-5 Billion, (fixed and recurring) • high operating costs from $60 -100 million per flight • relatively low reliability from around 90 - 98% (Aircraft system reliability is at least 99.9999%) • no abort capability, except shuttle in some cases • low flight rates and launch opportunities of 5 to 10 per year • long lead times from purchase to launch of 2 to 3 years • frequent delays measured in weeks, months or even years • no system resiliency, long standdown times after failures (months to years) • few servicing or payload recovery opportunities (STS only, 2-3 years wait)
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