Let me say before that, that these results depend upon the resolution of the technical problem areas that will be summarized toward the end of my statement. As of the 10-month study, and looking at one concept, one version of the satellite solar power station, we believe that the SSPS may be cost-effective with respect to terrestrial systems by the 1995 time period. Since most terrestrial concepts depend upon nonrenewable energy sources, the economic viability of SSPS may be enhanced relative to terrestrial systems beyond 1995. However, given the time period before SSPS may be cost effective, a decision to enter into a development-to-operations program or large- scale prototype, we do not believe is economically justifiable at this time. Given the potential economic benefits of SSPS in the 1995 time period, the many concepts that are currently being studied, the new design approaches that are being advanced and the number of possible approaches to the development and operations, the study results suggest that a significant research and assessment program is warranted over the next 4 to 5 years. The purpose of this program would be to provide reliable information on the economic and technical viability of the SSPS. Furthermore, SSPS, we believe, given our level of costing detail, would pay back an estimated $44 billion in D.D.T. & E.—-or design, development, testing, and evaluation by, say, calendar year 2015, with less than 60 operational 5,000-megawatt units. Now, let me interject that we do not believe—and I shall bring this up later—that this entire $44-billion D.D.T. & E. budget ought to be charged to SSPS. In other words, it may be that only about $20 billion of this $44 billion is a development, let's say, that would not have been initiated were it not for the decision to go ahead with an SSPS. The other $25 billion might well be expended for other space-type programs. In other words, the $20 billion may be the figure to look at, and not the $44 billion. And so this last result is rather conservative from an economic standpoint. The PRS concept—or the power relay satellite concept—that has been studied, has a decisive economic disadvantage over alternative terrestrial systems up to distances of about 3,500 nautical miles; that is, the distance or the longest distance, within the continental United States. Beyond this distance, were it deemed to be, say, in the national interest to engage in international transmissions of power, the PRS may be preferred over alternative transmission concepts. And these, Mr. Chairman, are the broad results of this study, regarding the limitations or caveats of the study, I would say, that the analysis has been deterministic; that is, we have not been able to consider risk and uncertainty in the costs at this time, both in the development and the operations of the program. Also, the economic results do not include the relative social and environmental impact that would be associated with, say, the satellite and the terrestrial systems. And differences among these systems may really be significant and, as I have said before, as important as the economic cost issues that we report on today.
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