—In early May 1981, an overwhelming 86% expressed opposition to any weakening of air pollution standards. By 93%, Americans were almost unanimous in opposing any diminution of environmental rules governing water pollution. Pluralities of 40% and 48%, respectively, held that current standards are still not protective enough of the people's health (30). —A New York Times poll (31) in September 1981 found that, by 45% to 42%, a plurality of the public agreed with the seemingly extreme environmentalist position that, “Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be made too high, and continuing improvements must be made regardless of cost.” The evidence suggests that environmental groups continue to represent a substantial, broad-based constituency of the American people. When specific trade-offs are posed and respondents are forced to consider the costs of achieving environmental goals, pluralities nevertheless continue to opt for environmental protection over lower prices, lower taxes, higher rates of economic growth, or more jobs. Only on the energy/environment trade-off is there evidence of strong ambivalence, with sizable minorities favoring each side of the issue (18, 28). When gas lines appear or other shortage-related events occur, the public will tend to lean temporarily toward the side of ensuring adequate energy supplies. The goals of the environmental movement appear to be firmly entrenched as an enduring part of the political value system and an important factor in the acceptability of any energy supply option. The Social Context of Energy Decisions The public opinion data indicate that a shift in perceptions and values occurred among the American people as a result of the events of the 1970s. The old consensus that favored putting economic imperatives above virtually all other considerations began to crumble during that decade, and there are few signs — even in today's conservative mood — to suggest that it might soon be restored. Americans have reluctantly but decisively lowered their economic expectations for the 1980s. Worried above all about inflation and unemployment, they hope for economic stability, and they are determined to preserve the material gains that they achieved through most of the 1970s (hence the increasing number of working wives and the trend toward smaller families) — but they do not seem prepared to make major sacrifices in order to reconstruct a high-growth economy. Deeply mistrustful of government officials, they approve of efforts — at least in principle — to cut back on the power that has been delegated to the government. Equally mistrusting of major corporations, no longer believing unambiguously in the benefits of science and technology, and strongly committed to environmental protection, Americans appear to be looking instead to more individual and local solutions, seeking more direct participation in the decisions that affect them. Collectively, these shifts in public perceptions make it appear unlikely that a strong consensus will emerge during the 1980s sufficient to support the costly development of new energy supplies. Instead, there will surely be persistent opposition to the social and environmental disruptions that are inherent in virtually all efforts to increase rapidly the domestic production of energy. Such opposition might well be overcome, however, if there were to develop a broad conviction that vast new energy supplies are desperately needed for the continued well-being of the nation. If the decade of the 1980s should witness a return to exponential growth in the U.S. demand for energy, the prospects would be signifi-
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