We may expect one American response would be that the planned Mk2 Shuttle (President Reagan's ‘new Orient Express') and transatmospheric vehicles (TAV's) will come forward, resulting in single stage to orbit capability by the year 2000 at the latest and possibly by 1995. The development of this technology will not be an economic dilemma, but only one of feasibility. Orbit-on-demand vehicles are increasingly seen by the USA as a general answer to Soviet space capability and necessary for SDI in any case. SDI seems to be the only US response available at this time to the economic threat of the Soviet Union's space industrialization programme. Modelling exercises show that no nation can afford a major war and space industrialization so a possible (intended) consequence of SDI is that no one will be able to do so-a valid result in games theory, at least. The DoD and NASA have recently awarded contracts for $450m for work over a 42-month period leading to a ‘National Aerospace Plane Project' [15]. Great faith seems to have been placed in American industry's ability to ‘come up with the goods', in this case the design of a viable ‘scramjet' to power the vehicle, when enticed with sufficiently fat rewards. CST is aware of both the great difficulties of this project and the ability of the Americans to solve it with sufficient cash. Enormous ground test equipment and modelling expenses are involved with such engines with non-optimum performance at low forward speed. HOTOL, by comparison, has thrust at zero forward speed and hence invokes no such penalties. The Soviets have not yet perceived the short-term possibility of this type of vehicle although they have been aware of their advantages since the 1950s. This factor may give the USA one of the few remaining space leads to be had. 5.2 Military Considerations Conflict between nations is sometimes regarded as economic before political before military and we believe that the SDI may possibly be a response to the long-term economic threat posed by the new Soviet launching system. It is, however, more likely that the level of sophistication necessary to view the SLW as an economic threat is not being employed. Whilst any transportation facility as general in application as the SLW can be used for military purposes, CST finds it difficult to rationalize it as a specifically military vehicle. If Soviet sources have been correctly understood the SLW system has been too carefully optimized for a very high rate of use compared with that required for military purposes and has a projected lifespan too long to be optimized around any particular military plans. Whilst large GEO battle-stations are obviously within its repertoire it is more than a simple war-horse. The Small Spaceplane. One part of the SLW system does seem to have a military dimension. This vehicle, designated the SL-X-16, [16] uses one of the strap-on boosters of the SLW as its first stage. The payload capability to LEO is given as 15 + tonnes and this would correspond to the expected mass of a small manned spaceplane. The latest DoD report [12] also states that the SL-X-16 is evidently designed for high launch rates and this could also relate to quick reaction manned missions. The same report also suggests that the spaceplane may have an anti-satellite mission when it becomes operational. It
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