could deliver sufficiently high energy densities to photovoltaic blankets to destroy the solar cells, the time required for such a weapon to scan a significant portion of the blankets would be prohibitively long. (Assuming a high-energy laser consuming 100 MW to produce 16 MW of laser power, and assuming the laser beam covers a spot 160 m^2 in area on the power satellite, so that significant damage is inflicted on the solar cells within 1 second,* the time required to scan the entire blanket would be 45 hours for the gallium option and twice as long for the silicon option.) 4.5.5 Rectenna Due to the distributed nature of the rectenna, it is difficult to inflict massive damage on it short of using a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, its large size would make it vulnerable to damage from electromagnetic pulses generated by high-altitude nuclear explosions (above 50 kilometers altitude) during a nuclear exchange. Commando or terrorist attacks on the rectenna would likely focus on the pilot beam transmitter, beam position sensors and the associated computers, power collection buses, power conditioners, and the utility interface equipment. All of these should be reparable fairly rapidly if spares are available, limiting the effectiveness of such assaults. 4.5.6 Command, Control and Communications System Any local C^2 centers in the network can be damaged by small conventional explosives, as could transmitters, receivers, antennae, and landlines. Good engineering practice already includes redundancy, limiting the effectiveness of as- saults on only one or a few centers. For attacks on the C^3 system to be effective, multiple coordinated assaults would be required, including numerous saboteurs. 4.6 Misperceptions Concerning the SPS Vulnerabilities A number of misperceptions about the vulnerability of the SPS have become widespread. A common mistake is to underestimate the effort required to carry out a particular assault. For example, some observers consider the power satellites to be highly vulnerable to missiles landed from Earth. The energy required to deorbit a power satellite, however, is enormous, obviating this threat unless the missile has a nuclear warhead. Even then, getting close enough requires a multistage rocket with sophisticated guidance. *See Appendix C.3 for details.
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