Military Implications of an SPS

Cover	1
TItle Page	3
Clausewitz quote	5
Acknowledgements	6
Forward	7
Table of Contents	8
1.0 Introduction and Conclusions	19
1.1 Background and Motivation for this Study	19
1.2 Scenarios for SPS Programs	20
1.3 Assumptions	23
1.4 Method of Approach	26
1.5 Conclusions	29
1.6 References and Notes	31
2.0 System Definition	33
2.1 Transportation Systems	33
2.2 Low Earth Orbit Base	37
2.3 Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Base	39
2.4 Power Satellites	40
2.5 Rectenna	44
2.6 Command and Control (C^2 ) System	45
2.7 Communications System	50
2.8 References	51
3.0 Threat Analysis	53
3.1 Methodology	53
3.2 Potential Military Uses of the Reference Design SPS	54
3.2.1 Force Delivery	56
3.2.2 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C I)	62
3.2.3 Military Support	65
3.2.3.1 Military Support Adapters for SPS	65
3.2.3.2 Military Support Missions for a SPS with Military Enhancements	66
3.3 Institutional Threats	68
3.4 Credibility of Threats	69
3.5 Threat/Safeguard Matrix	71
3.6 Summary	72
3.7 References and Notes	73
4.0 Vulnerability Analysis	85
4.1 Methodology	85
4.2 Generic Types of Assaults	86
4.3 Scenarios for Assaults Against SPS	89
4.4 Technological Vulnerabilities	90
4.4.1 Physical Contact	91
4.4.2 Standoff Weapons	93
4.4.3 Electronic Warfare	96
4.4.4 Chaff Deployment	98
4.5 Vulnerabilities of Specific SPS Elements	99
4.5.1 The Transportation System	99
4.5.2 The LEO Base	100
4.5.3 The GEO Base	100
4.5.4 Power Satellites	100
4.5.5 Rectenna	101
4.5.6 Command, Control and Communications System	101
4.6 Misperceptions Concerning the SPS Vulnerabilities	101
4.7 Vulnerability/Safeguard Matrix	102
4.8 Comparative Vulnerability of the Satellite Power System	108
4.9 Summary	110
4.10 References	111
5.0 Safeguards Analysis	113
5.1 Technological Safeguards	114
5.2 Institutional Safeguards	118
5.3 Key Safeguards	119
5.4 International Resident Inspection Operation (RIO)	122
5.5 Summary	125
APPENDIX A Guidelines for Resident Inspection Operations (RIO)	127
A.	128
A.1 General Consideration	128
A.2 Institutional Arrangements of RIO	129
A. 3 Operational Considerations	131
A.4 Conclusion	134
APPENDIX B Multilateral Ageements Regarding MIlitary Implications of SPS	137
B.	138
B.1.Types of Multilateral Agreements	138
B.2. Concerns for SPS Multilateral Treaties	141
B.2.1 Negotiating Positions	142
B.2.2 Selected Provisions	143
B.3 References and Notes1.	146
APPENDIX C: Technocal Background Papers	149
C.1 Nuclear Weapon Effects on Satellite Power Systems	150
C.1.1 Basic Nuclear Effects of Concern	150
C.1.2 Typical Space System Vulnerability Levels	152
C.1.3 Protecting SPS Elements Against Nuclear Weapon Effects	155
C.1.4 Summary	158
C.2 Particle Beam Weapons (PBW) and SPS	159
C.2.1 General Character of Spaceborne PBW Systems	159
C.2.2 Basic Exoatmospheric PBW Lethality Considerations	160
C.2.3 Safeguards/Countermeasures	162
C.2.5 Summary	163
C.2.6 References	164
C.3 High Energy Laser and SPS	165
C.3.1 System Description	165
C.3.2 Performance Assessment	167
C.3.3 Strategic Use of an SPS Laser System	170
C.3.4 SPS Vulnerability to HEL	170
C.3.5 Implementation	173
C.3.6 Safeguards	173
C.3.7 References and Notes	175
C.4 Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)	176
C.4.1 The SPS as an EW Weapon/Platform	176
C.4.2 EW Threats to the SPS	177
C.4.3 EW and SPS Self-Protection	183
C.4.4 References	184
C.5 Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) and SPS	185
C.5.1 CBW Vulnerability	185
C.5.2 CBW Threat	186
C.6 Weather Modification as an Auxiliary Role for the SPS	188
C.6.1 Feasibility	188
C.6.2 Possible Other Effects of Microwave Transmission	191
C.6.3 References	192
List of Tables	11
1-1. SSummary of Key Issues Identified in Previous Studies	21
SPS System and Subsystem Elements	34
2-2. Reference SPS Transportation Systems and Operations	36
3-1. Possible Military Adapters for SPS	56
3-2. Uses of Force Delivery Devices	61
3-3. Uses of C3I Devices and Facilities	64
3-4. Uses of Military Support Devices	67
3-5. Institutional Threats	68
3-6. Earth-To-Space Threats	75
3-7. Space-To-Earth Threats	76
3-8. Space-To-Space Threats	77
3-9. Threat/Safeguards Matrix for the SPS	79
4-1. Possible Technological Means of Assault Against SPS	92
4-2. Common Misperceptions Regarding SPS Vulnerability	103
4-3. Vulnerabilities/Safeguards Matrix for the SPS	104
5-1 Technological Safeguards for SPS	115
5-2. Institutional Safeguards for SPS	118
5-3. SPS Safeguard Summary	120
5-4. Principal Safeguards	121
A-1. RIO Manning Requirements	132
C.1-1. Estimated Vulnverability Thresholds	154
C.2-1 Nominal PBW Parameter Summary	160
C. 2-2 PBW Lethality Mechanisms Summary	163
C.3-1. Power Satellite-Based Laser Performance (Nominal)	168
C.3-2. Power Satellite-Based Laser Performance (Optimistic)	168
C.3-3. Earth-to-GEO Performance	169
Fig C.3-4. Short wavelength coupling coefficients.	169
Fig C.3-5. Solar cell equilibrium temperature as a function of incident irradiance.	174
Fig C.4-1. Representative Chaff Attenuation.Path Geometry	180
C.4-2. ’’Worst Case" Chaff Deployment Against the SPS Pilot Beam	182
List of Figures	13
2-1. Command, control, and communications	46
C.2-1. Block diagram of a conceptual exoatmospheric particle beam weapon	161
C.3-1. An electric discharge laser (EDL) for space. A closed-cycle subsonic-gas-flow system.	166
C.3-2. HEL system weight.	166
C.3-3. HEL system volume.	166
Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms	14

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