Some RIO communications would be made in the clear. Others would be made on secure, scrambled channels. SPS operators and managers, and especially world military personnel, should not know what RIO is doing at all times. A secure channel to RIO headquarters would be necessary to allow the RIO command to work quietly with SPS management to clarify or rectify perceived problems without prematurely bringing them to the full attention of others. Table A-2 lists a number of operational questions which will arise in the design and implementation of RIO; these are left for further study. A.4 Conclusion RIO’s trustworthiness ultimately will rest on the inclusion of every nation wishing to have inspection access to the SPS. To the extent that SPS were perceived to have the potential of wielding a significant military threat, other nations would be strongly motivated to participate in RIO even if the SPS program were unilaterally implemented by the U.S. Such motivations should also minimize obstacles to negotiating the structure and implementation of RIO. RIO’s effectiveness would rest primarily on the random nature of its Resident Inspection Teams and Spot Check Teams, on the impermanent nature of its Resident Inspection Teams, and on its ability to communicate at will. Fundamental questions requiring examination in depth include: (1) Are there existing umbrella organizations that might provide a base for RIO and oversee its operations? Should RIO be created entirely new as a distinct international entity? (2) RIO appears to be imperative if SPS is to be internationally acceptable. What are some scenarios and their consequences without a RIO? Without RIO, is the military utilization of the SPS system inevitable in view of the sheer size, cost, and complexity of the system as well as the impact on terrestrial users if the SPS output were diverted to military uses?
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