Military Implications of an SPS

5.4 International Resident Inspection Operation (RIO) The uses of space stations like SPS for military purposes are so varied that a piecemeal analysis of each potential threat, coupled with detailed steps to counter it, can hardly satisfy the proper doubts and concerns of critics. This is because of the inherent danger of threat potentials that surface only after an initial go- ahead has been obtained. Each new threat possibility, whether real or fancied, could be used as an excuse for cessation of any SPS program. (We have seen this method applied to nuclear power projects in this country and elsewhere.) A general solution is therefore required, that is clearly satisfactory in principle. It has been suggested that, in accordance with the 1967 Treaty on Principles, nations building power satellites might allow inspection visits at space facilities (including the power satellites themselves) by observers from non-participating countries at random intervals, with minimum advance notice. While such a proposal has some merit, it is not likely to allay all fears of SPS military threats. In the next few decades, the capabilities of spacefaring nations or consortia will be substantial. It would thus be feasible, for example, for a battery of high-energy lasers (together with the focusing, tracking, and pointing equipment necessary for a ballistic missile defense system) to be concealed in deep space beyond tracking range. In time of impending crisis, such a weapon system could be brought up rapidly for attachment to its power source, a power satellite, without detection by other nations. Only if an international inspection team were in permanent residence aboard each power satellite and each SPS facility in space could every nation on Earth be assured that such military use or conversion of the SPS would not remain undetected. If an international Resident Inspection Operation (RIO) is to successfully allay reasonable fears about military uses or abuses of SPS, it must be open to participation in the inspection program by any nation which is concerned about potential SPS threats to its national security. International confidence in SPS would then rest on the opportunity for observers designated by a variety of nations to inspect any portion of SPS on a continuing basis and on the ability of RIO inspection teams to report to RIO headquarters on Earth (and thus to the international community) the absence of military activities or hardware aboard SPS elements.

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