While international observers have played a useful role in a number of cases of potential or actual international conflict, a lesson of history is clear: once open hostilities begin, the presence of international inspection teams will be ignored by all combatants. It is thus likely that SPS, even under international resident inspection, may still have need for self-defensive capabilities. RIO, however, could guarantee that the capabilities of such weapon systems were indeed limited strictly to self-defense. A high energy laser incapable of focusing its beam to incendiary levels for ranges greater than a few hunded kilometers, for example, would hardly constitute a grave threat to other nations if it were deployed on a highly unmaneuverable power satellite in geosynchronous orbit more than 36,000 kilometers above the equator. For an inspection organization to be effective and credible, it must have assured means of access to all parts of the SPS and assured means of communications between all its operatives and headquarters. If RIO were dependent on the SPS operational entities for these services, a variety of "reasonable" excuses might be invoked by the operational entities to refuse these services at time of international crisis or of national emergency, just when the international community most urgently needs assurances that SPS elements are not being converted or adapted for military use. RIO must thus have its own space transportation capabilities and its own communications systems. We thus envision RIO teams residing aboard each power satellite, aboard the LEO and GEO bases, and at each rectenna site. At the SPS launch facilities, all baggage and cargo to be loaded aboard SPS launch vehicles would be subject to RIO examination. In addition, RIO teams would have carte blanche access to SPS records and blueprints at offices and facilities of both the legal and operational entities controlling SPS. During the DDT&E phase, RIO would review experimental hardware and blueprints for evidence of military adaptations. In addition to inspection teams residing at various SPS sites, RIO would also have a number of inspection teams roving at large to perform random spot checks on both RIO teams and SPS to minimize chances of collusion between RIO teams and the SPS operational entities. Fairly frequent rotation of RIO personnel would further minimize this risk. Appendix A discusses RIO further and provides rough estimates of minimum manpower levels for RIO at the midpoint of SPS deployment in the Reference Design, when thirty 5-GW units are in place and two more units are being built each year.
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