Each power satellite and each rectenna built by the operational entities would then be sold with the understanding that the buyer accepts RIO teams in perpetuity both aboard the power satellite and at the rectenna site. Nations objecting to international inspection of any facilities within their borders but still wishing to use SPS for part of their energy supply would have the options of placing the rectenna offshore or of attempting to lease a rectenna site in a neighboring country which has no objections to such inspection. Member states of RIO could appeal to Article IX of the 1967 Treaty on Principles which states: ....If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it...would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States’ Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space..., it shall undertake appropriate international consultations be fore proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party...would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space...may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment. Regarding the vulnerability of SPS, defensive weapon systems in space (such as ASAT, PBW, or HEL) could be considered in violation of the 1967 Treaty on Principles and the spirit of the proposed Moon Treaty as infringements on the peaceful uses of outer space by SPS. If the first power satellite were deployed by the United States for its own energy purposes initially, or deployed in cooperation with such friendly countries as the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and members of the European Space Agency, it would clearly fall within the terms of existing treaties regarding scientific research and development for peaceful purposes. This affords another legal institutional safeguard, particularly if subsequent power satellites were planned to be utilized for the benefit of other nations participating in some kind of SPS umbrella organization analogous to INTELSAT. The organization and form of the initial ownership arrangements for SPS will clearly be a very strong determinative factor in the legal institutional safeguards for SPS. The success of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Program lends some credibility to the proposal that the United States (with private sector participation) and the Soviet
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