While examples of means of inserting false information into the C3 system are numerous, it appears that one or more of the following preconditions must be met before assaults of this type can succeed: 3 o The C system would have to be poorly designed, failing to incorporate standard error detection and signal verification techniques. o Saboteurs would have had to implant "black boxes" or tapped into transmission circuits successfully, with these alterations remaining undetected until used in an assault. o Hostile espionage activities would need to have obtained detailed design and system operating information, including exact message formats and encrypting algorithms. In summary, it does not appear that EW techniques by themselves used against 3 the SPS C system pose a serious threat. In concert with other forms of assault, however, EW could doubtless enhance the effectiveness of the attack. 4.4.4 Chaff Deployment In the Reference System, the pilot beam transmitter antenna is located in the middle of the rectenna and transmits its signal directly to the power satellite providing power to that rectenna. Since the transmitter array aboard the power satellite subtends a very small angle at the pilot beam transmitter (less than onetenth of a minute of arc), a plume of chaff at an altitude of 10 kilometers (39,000 feet) would have to be only a few meters wide to block the pilot beam totally, provided the chaff dipoles in the beam were sufficiently dense to attenuate the microwave signal from the pilot beam transmitter. Detailed analysis in Appendix C.4, however, shows that the chaff would spread out and descend toward the ground sufficiently fast that, even in the worst case light-wind conditions, the interruption of the pilot beam would last no more than a few minutes. Chaff dropped in the microwave power beam would, of course, scatter microwave radiation in all directions, and might provide some radio frequency interference in receivers unrelated to the SPS located in the vicinity of the rectenna. Since receivers and other electronic equipment intended for use near the rectenna would be designed for minimum sensitivity to the SPS carrier frequency in any case, the scattered radiation would not be expected to disrupt other equipment.
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