4.0 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS In considering the potential vulnerability of the Satellite Power System we must consider not only the vulnerability issues of a highly concentrated generating capacity (5 GW at a single rectenna site) but also the vulnerability issues of placing very expensive elements of the system (the power satellites themselves, the LEO and GEO bases, and fleets of space vehicles) outside the presumably defensible territorial limits of the nations which own, operate, and/or use these valuable assets. The potential for loss of power at the utility grid interface is a function of SPS vulnerability in the broadest sense of the term. Issues such as component reliability, random accidents, natural disasters, and hostile actions represent categories of vulnerability. We are concerned here only with the last of these categories. Vulnerability as a military issue seems, on the surface, relatively simple to address. Sabotage or attack as part of a military operation by one nation against another would be the simplest definition to accept. We found it necessary to widen this definition considerably to address in a reasonably complete fashion the breadth of system vulnerabilities germane to all military considerations. For example, actions by terrorist groups, mutiny by established crews, espionage by hostile countries, and nuclear weapons tests in space by other nations must all be considered to get a well-rounded picture of the whole range of vulnerability issues. 4.1 Methodology The matrix approach to structuring the assessment outlined in Section 3 was also used in this portion of the study. The two major issues addressed in column format were vulnerabilities and safeguards. Vulnerabilities were divided into technological and institutional types, with the former further broken down to Force Delivery and C3I. (Military support systems are used either to enable or to assist Force Delivery or C3I missions; the enemy’s military support systems thus do not pose any direct threat to SPS and are not included in the discussion here.) Safeguards were also divided into technological and institutional types, with technological safeguards further resolved as either active or passive measures.
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