of this study are discussed in this section. In some instances, consideration was given briefly to alternative possibilities where our assumptions might be considered controversial or where interesting differences in implications could be expected. 1. Civilian Nature of the Program. We have assumed that the national policy decision by the United States to participate in a full-scale SPS program is motivated by the nation's domestic need for energy rather than by strategic considerations regarding national defense. Under this assumption, SPS is considered to be designed as a civilian system only. The U.S. portions of the program are then operated by the private sector, by civilian branches of the government, or by some combination of these. (See References 6 and 7 for discussions of possible financing and management alternatives for SPS.) In case of a national emergency, however, equipment and facilities owned by U.S. entities may come under direct control of, or even direct use by, the National Command Authorities, as is the case today for certain major private sector activities such as the commercial airlines. 2. U.S. Role in the SPS Program. Although substantial interest has been expressed in the SPS concept by government and business leaders in many other countries, most of the R&D effort on SPS to date has been provided by the United States. Should the R&D program conclude that it is definitely worth pursuing the DDT&E phase, we have assumed that the United States would be among the first to make a significant committment to that phase. Once a system for construction of power satellites is in place (following completion of the startup phase), power satellites built by the United States and its partners could be sold, leased, or otherwise made available to nonparticipating countries on a commercial basis or on an international development aid basis. We do not assume that power satellites would be owned and operated exclusively by the United States. (The Reference Design report assumes that power satellites are built by the U.S. solely for domestic energy production.) Many of the military issues of SPS would seem to be largely moot if the operational entities for SPS were fully multilateral from the very beginning of the DDT&E phase (if not sooner). It is certainly a more difficult task to devise means to defuse the military issues of threat and vulnerability for a unilateral SPS program. For the purpose of this study, then, we have focused our attention on this most difficult case; an internationalized SPS would certainly be easier to safeguard in a manner acceptable to most national governments.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTU5NjU0Mg==