to defend against such weapons, comprehensive space surveillance should be able to detect such vehicles upon launch. Any foreseeable non-nuclear weapons which could be added to SPS would be less threatening than the strategic nuclear arsenals already deployed on Earth. (4) C3I modules having tactical and strategic significance could be added to a Satellite Power System but would require engineering modifications. The most significant such additions which are unique to SPS (due to the availability of large quantities of electrical power) are EW jammers and direct broadcast to the population of a hostile country. (5) The power satellites could be used as a power source (with laser transmission) for military satellites or to allow long-duration flight of military aricraft at high altitudes. (6) The power satellites themselves, in the Reference Design SPS, are vulnerable to system-generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) effects resulting from the gamma-ray and x-ray emissions of nuclear explosions. Use of nuclear weapons for this purpose, however, may result in damage ranging from slight to extensive to other spacecraft (including those of the attacker) at comparable range from the explosion. The Reference Design was not intended to consider these vulnerabilities, and it may be possible to incorporate adequate hardening features. Various design alternatives for SPS may be less sensitive or may be more easily hardened against this threat. (7) The various system and subsystem elements of the SPS are vulnerable to a variety of types of attack, but are inherently no more vulnerable than existing elements of the civilian economic infrastructure, including electrical generating plants, petroleum refineries, electrical power transmission and distribution networks, pipeline systems, railroads, aircraft and airports, and communications networks. The survivability of each system and subsystem element is sensitive to design details and survivability considerations for SPS would be integrated with other engineering design and program management design from the start. (8) Military implications of SPS are concept dependent. Therefore, appraisal of the military implications of SPS generically requires that alternative SPS system concepts be evaluated to the same depth as the photovoltaic SPS Reference Design considered in the bulk of this study. (9) Certain issues have been raised about the capability of a Satellite Power System to effect military force delivery or to survive military attack. Several of these issues are based on misperceptions about the SPS concept. These misperceptions may be overcome, but only if discussions about SPS are carried on in an atmosphere of openness and candor. (10) Numerous safeguards have been identified against the threats which a SPS with enhanced military capabilities might pose to other countries, and
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