Sabotage is always a serious consideration in complex systems because of the potential for disrupting significant system elements by interrupting a relatively small but critical component. Given the panoply of complex systems involved in deployment and operation of the Satellite Power System, sabotage could be effective and difficult to guard against completely. Small quantities of gases, liquids, or fibers (such as chopped, high-modulus graphite) released in the right place could wreak havoc in sophisticated vehicles, orbital facilities, or fabrication plants. More overt attacks by saboteurs, using plastic explosives, for example, have obvious destructive potential. In the context of the Satellite Power System, mutiny means rebellion against established authority by some portion of a trained crew who take control of part or all of their assigned system or subsystem element. Mutiny differs significantly from other types of assaults in that the mutineers are thoroughly familiar with the system itself and with its built-in safeguards. Such a crew has most likely been on station long enough before overt mutiny to have had ample opportunity to study the safeguard systems and to nullify at least some of them surreptitiously. Attack includes any explicit action which might be taken by hostile nations or groups to disable some portion or all of the Satellite Power System, including its supporting elements. At least in the DDT&E phase of the SPS program and probably in the early years of SPS deployment and operations, the threat from terrorists can be confined to Earthside elements of the SPS. However, the commandeering or hijacking of launch vehicles, whether manned or unmanned, and of manned OTVs, cannot be entirely ruled out as a possibility, especially if the hijackers are willing to carry out a suicidal mission. A system as complex and as extensive as the SPS can also be harassed by a wide range of legal and quasi-legal means short of actual violence. Recent history provides a number of examples which could be replayed in analogous forms against the SPS in various stages of the program. A country determined to harass the SPS might deliberately place inexpensive unmanned satellites on trajectories or in orbits passing close to SPS facilities. Deliberate misinformation and adverse propaganda can also serve to harass a program such as SPS. In the extreme case, a hostile power could mount a covert campaign to
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