Military Implications of an SPS

5 .0 SAFEGUARDS ANALYSIS The preceding two sections developed a catalog of potential military threats which might be posed by the SPS or its elements, with and without modifications to enhance its military capabilities, and of potential vulnerabilities of the SPS or its elements. We turn now to an analysis of potential safeguards against these threats and vulnerabilities. First we will describe each of the technological and institutional safeguards we have identified, indicating the applicability of each to specific threats or vulnerabilities. We will then discuss in greater depth several safeguards which we consider to be especially important, concluding with a discussion of a possible scenario for the use of the Satellite Power System as a key element in strategic arms control. The term "safeguard" is used here instead of terms such as "countermeasure" or "protection" since it has a broader meaning. In this discussion, the term "safeguard" encompasses protection of an object from actual assault; means of deterring an enemy from initiating an assault; and methods of preventing or forestalling implementation of a potential threat capability. Protection of a spacecraft from enemy attack, for example, could be accomplished by passive measures such as hardening or protective coatings, or by active measures such as deployable shields, expulsion of chaff clouds, evasive maneuvering, or active self-defense using various weapons to destroy an incoming orbital interceptor. Deterrence requires the threatened party to develop and deploy military capabilities which can be used to retaliate against an assailant. For example, attack upon space objects could be deterred by developing suitable capabilities to retaliate against enemy space systems. Deterrence is based on any type of forcedelivery capability. In our analysis we have emphasized only safeguards which can be applied specifically against a particular threat. We have not considered the neutralization of a threat by "secondary means," such as threatening to launch an ICBM attack against any nation which attacks a vital space system. The possibilities for such "indirect deterrence" are numerous but are beyond the scope of this study. Deterrence as defined above includes treaties and agreements to forbid attacks upon space systems. However, such legal documents are peripheral to the force

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