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195
Military Implications of an SPS
Cover
1
TItle Page
3
Clausewitz quote
5
Acknowledgements
6
Forward
7
Table of Contents
8
1.0 Introduction and Conclusions
19
1.1 Background and Motivation for this Study
19
1.2 Scenarios for SPS Programs
20
1.3 Assumptions
23
1.4 Method of Approach
26
1.5 Conclusions
29
1.6 References and Notes
31
2.0 System Definition
33
2.1 Transportation Systems
33
2.2 Low Earth Orbit Base
37
2.3 Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Base
39
2.4 Power Satellites
40
2.5 Rectenna
44
2.6 Command and Control (C^2 ) System
45
2.7 Communications System
50
2.8 References
51
3.0 Threat Analysis
53
3.1 Methodology
53
3.2 Potential Military Uses of the Reference Design SPS
54
3.2.1 Force Delivery
56
3.2.2 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C I)
62
3.2.3 Military Support
65
3.2.3.1 Military Support Adapters for SPS
65
3.2.3.2 Military Support Missions for a SPS with Military Enhancements
66
3.3 Institutional Threats
68
3.4 Credibility of Threats
69
3.5 Threat/Safeguard Matrix
71
3.6 Summary
72
3.7 References and Notes
73
4.0 Vulnerability Analysis
85
4.1 Methodology
85
4.2 Generic Types of Assaults
86
4.3 Scenarios for Assaults Against SPS
89
4.4 Technological Vulnerabilities
90
4.4.1 Physical Contact
91
4.4.2 Standoff Weapons
93
4.4.3 Electronic Warfare
96
4.4.4 Chaff Deployment
98
4.5 Vulnerabilities of Specific SPS Elements
99
4.5.1 The Transportation System
99
4.5.2 The LEO Base
100
4.5.3 The GEO Base
100
4.5.4 Power Satellites
100
4.5.5 Rectenna
101
4.5.6 Command, Control and Communications System
101
4.6 Misperceptions Concerning the SPS Vulnerabilities
101
4.7 Vulnerability/Safeguard Matrix
102
4.8 Comparative Vulnerability of the Satellite Power System
108
4.9 Summary
110
4.10 References
111
5.0 Safeguards Analysis
113
5.1 Technological Safeguards
114
5.2 Institutional Safeguards
118
5.3 Key Safeguards
119
5.4 International Resident Inspection Operation (RIO)
122
5.5 Summary
125
APPENDIX A Guidelines for Resident Inspection Operations (RIO)
127
A.
128
A.1 General Consideration
128
A.2 Institutional Arrangements of RIO
129
A. 3 Operational Considerations
131
A.4 Conclusion
134
APPENDIX B Multilateral Ageements Regarding MIlitary Implications of SPS
137
B.
138
B.1.Types of Multilateral Agreements
138
B.2. Concerns for SPS Multilateral Treaties
141
B.2.1 Negotiating Positions
142
B.2.2 Selected Provisions
143
B.3 References and Notes1.
146
APPENDIX C: Technocal Background Papers
149
C.1 Nuclear Weapon Effects on Satellite Power Systems
150
C.1.1 Basic Nuclear Effects of Concern
150
C.1.2 Typical Space System Vulnerability Levels
152
C.1.3 Protecting SPS Elements Against Nuclear Weapon Effects
155
C.1.4 Summary
158
C.2 Particle Beam Weapons (PBW) and SPS
159
C.2.1 General Character of Spaceborne PBW Systems
159
C.2.2 Basic Exoatmospheric PBW Lethality Considerations
160
C.2.3 Safeguards/Countermeasures
162
C.2.5 Summary
163
C.2.6 References
164
C.3 High Energy Laser and SPS
165
C.3.1 System Description
165
C.3.2 Performance Assessment
167
C.3.3 Strategic Use of an SPS Laser System
170
C.3.4 SPS Vulnerability to HEL
170
C.3.5 Implementation
173
C.3.6 Safeguards
173
C.3.7 References and Notes
175
C.4 Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
176
C.4.1 The SPS as an EW Weapon/Platform
176
C.4.2 EW Threats to the SPS
177
C.4.3 EW and SPS Self-Protection
183
C.4.4 References
184
C.5 Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) and SPS
185
C.5.1 CBW Vulnerability
185
C.5.2 CBW Threat
186
C.6 Weather Modification as an Auxiliary Role for the SPS
188
C.6.1 Feasibility
188
C.6.2 Possible Other Effects of Microwave Transmission
191
C.6.3 References
192
List of Tables
11
1-1. SSummary of Key Issues Identified in Previous Studies
21
SPS System and Subsystem Elements
34
2-2. Reference SPS Transportation Systems and Operations
36
3-1. Possible Military Adapters for SPS
56
3-2. Uses of Force Delivery Devices
61
3-3. Uses of C3I Devices and Facilities
64
3-4. Uses of Military Support Devices
67
3-5. Institutional Threats
68
3-6. Earth-To-Space Threats
75
3-7. Space-To-Earth Threats
76
3-8. Space-To-Space Threats
77
3-9. Threat/Safeguards Matrix for the SPS
79
4-1. Possible Technological Means of Assault Against SPS
92
4-2. Common Misperceptions Regarding SPS Vulnerability
103
4-3. Vulnerabilities/Safeguards Matrix for the SPS
104
5-1 Technological Safeguards for SPS
115
5-2. Institutional Safeguards for SPS
118
5-3. SPS Safeguard Summary
120
5-4. Principal Safeguards
121
A-1. RIO Manning Requirements
132
C.1-1. Estimated Vulnverability Thresholds
154
C.2-1 Nominal PBW Parameter Summary
160
C. 2-2 PBW Lethality Mechanisms Summary
163
C.3-1. Power Satellite-Based Laser Performance (Nominal)
168
C.3-2. Power Satellite-Based Laser Performance (Optimistic)
168
C.3-3. Earth-to-GEO Performance
169
Fig C.3-4. Short wavelength coupling coefficients.
169
Fig C.3-5. Solar cell equilibrium temperature as a function of incident irradiance.
174
Fig C.4-1. Representative Chaff Attenuation.Path Geometry
180
C.4-2. ’’Worst Case" Chaff Deployment Against the SPS Pilot Beam
182
List of Figures
13
2-1. Command, control, and communications
46
C.2-1. Block diagram of a conceptual exoatmospheric particle beam weapon
161
C.3-1. An electric discharge laser (EDL) for space. A closed-cycle subsonic-gas-flow system.
166
C.3-2. HEL system weight.
166
C.3-3. HEL system volume.
166
Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms
14
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