Military Implications of an SPS

Thus, there are a number of forms for multilateral SPS agreements. Since the purpose of the agreements would be to assure against military threats and vulnerabilities associated with SPS facilities, the binding treaty form would be optimal. The principle of good faith adherence to the terms and conditions of binding treaties would afford the maximum assurance to all parties that SPS facilities would not be utilized as a military weapon and that it would not be vulnerable to military action. However, given the fact that the binding nature of treaties is at best temporary, there must be underlying checks and balances which will support the continued good faith adherence of treaty provisions by all parties. The creation of an international organization for the ownership and operation of SPS facilities has been considered unlikely for the first United States SPS system due to the delays and excessive costs involved in international projects and U.S. foreign policy concerns, including limitations on technology transfer and freedom from dependence on foreign energy sources. Therefore, it would seem unlikely that there would be a promulgation of a multilateral treaty that would create a new international Organization with regard to the ownership of the SPS. However, given a tendency among developing States to claim portions of the benefits derived from utilization and exploitation of international resources, and given the view that monitoring of SPS facilities should be conducted by an independent authority, there may be pressure to create an international organization which, although not part of the management or control of SPS facilities, would manage the distribution of benefits from, or otherwise monitor, such facilities. B.2. Concerns for SPS Multilateral Treaties Any agreement associated with SPS development must be based upon underlying benefits to all parties or there will be little motivation for continued good faith adherence to treaty provisions. Thus, it is appropriate to assess the relative benefits to, and negotiating positions of, various States with regard to the unilateral development by the United States of a SPS. Any such agreement would contain numerous provisions ranging from standards for environmental protection to prohibition of certain types of weapons systems, and therefore a complete identification of all possible provisions is beyond the scope of this appendix. However, a few salient substantive provisions can be analyzed.

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