Military Implications of an SPS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In view of the complexity of the subject of the military implications of the Satellite Power System, the authors of this report are indebted to many other people for sharing their expertise and experience in advanced technologies, international law, military doctrine, and national security policy. We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Tony W. Armstrong on particle beam weapons; Richard D. Binkowski on high energy lasers; Robert Bundgaard on weather modification; Charles W. Cates on rules of engagement and predelegated authority; Phil K. Chapman on laser propulsion and strategic uses of high energy lasers; K. Eric Drexler on advanced deep space propulsion, especially on high energy lasers; Marvin Leibstone on terrorism and insurgency; Phil K. Mitchell on electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures; E. Roland Parkinson on particle beam weapons; Delbert D. Smith on international law; Lewis J. Stecher on rules of engagement for defense of the SPS; William W. Stoner on optical target acquisition and tracking, especially using lidars; Donald W. Stribling on nuclear weapons effects; and Robert Widder on disarmament policy. This report has been considerably strengthened, in our view, by the efforts of a number of reviewers who carefully critiqued the first draft. We wish to thank Hubert Davis, Peter E. Glaser, Stanley G. Rosen, and Barry J. Smernoff for their comments and criticisms. Inevitably, we did not see eye-to-eye with our reviewers on all issues; they do not necessarily endorse all the views and findings presented in this report.

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