Union join in the planning, design, and construction of the initial SPS to reduce perceived threats. However, because of technology transfer limitations in the United States, the most practical approach may be for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and Western European nations to join and proceed together. Insurance and indemnity for SPS hazards might then be legally obtainable from private and governmental sources. Satellite life insurance, perhaps on a three- year basis with renewals, and with or without war risk exclusions, would be desirable. Any conversion of SPS facilities into a military weapon capable of damaging the Earth, its environment, other satellites, or SPS facilities may be a violation of the existing treaties, especially if it could be argued that directed energy weapons using a sizeable portion of a power satellite’s output constitute "weapon (s) of mass destruction."^ The RIO appears potentially promising in providing assurances that SPS is not a weapons system or an antiweapons system, and will not become one. On the basis of the estimated transportation and staffing requirements for RIO given in Tables 2-2 and A-l respectively, it is evident that capital and recurring costs of RIO would be no more than a modest fraction of total SPS costs. 5.5 Summary Over thirty distinct possible means can be identified which promise to be credible and effective safeguards against SPS threats and/or vulnerabilities. Comprehensive projections of expected effectiveness require more detailed investigations. Acceptability and cost considerations appear reasonable. Further understanding of the possible mechanisms and implications of international agreements is required. 1 However, note that the term "weapon of mass destruction" is undefined in international law. Its use in parallel with the term "nuclear weapons" suggests that much greater destruction than could be delivered by PBW’s or HEL’s was contemplated in drafting the treaty. One should also note that the Soviet development of ASAT’s, if protested by the United States under Article IX of the Treaty on Principles, would likely be defended by the U.S.S.R. as posing no threat to peaceful uses of outer space, but only to hostile (military) uses of space, and thus not prohibited by Article IX. Similar arguments could be made to justify active defensive weaponry aboard power satellites and other SPS facilities in Earth orbit.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTU5NjU0Mg==