of the major systems and subsystems of the SPS. Insofar as enhanced military capabilities may be added to the system, such military capabilities must also be considered as major system and subsystem elements of SPS in the analysis. For each subsystem element, we consider the specific threats that element could pose to ground or space systems of another nation, including both technological and institutional means afforded by the SPS. For each threat posed by a subsystem, one or more safeguards are identified and examined. We then consider for each subsystem element of the SPS (but not of military adapters to the SPS) the specific ways in which a threat could be deployed against it by a hostile institutional means. Again, for each such vulnerability of the SPS or any subelement, one or more safeguards are identified and examined. This analysis results in two matrices, one of threats and safeguards versus subsystem elements of the SPS, with and without military adapters; the other, of vulnerabilities and safeguards versus subsystem elements of the SPS itself, without military adapters. (It is not within the scope of this study to consider the vulnerabilities of military hardware which might be attached to SPS elements.) The study approach, then, is as follows: (1) Define the system and subsystem elements of the SPS and of military adapters which might be added to it, either overtly or covertly. (2) Examine likely technological developments in key areas over the next twenty to fifty years (when the Reference Design SPS is assumed to be deployed) to permit definition of likely threats or vulnerabilities of SPS elements. (3) Element by element, examine the applicability of these technologies to providing the SPS with significant military capabilities or to providing hostile forces with means of attacking SPS elements. Using the same data base, examine possible safeguards against each potentially real threat or vulnerability identified. The system and subsystem elements of the SPS for the purposes of this study are described in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the threat issues we have identified and considered. Section 4 discusses the vulnerability issues, primarily of the Reference Design, with occasional comments on differences in vulnerabilities among alternative SPS designs. Section 5 then identifies and analyzes safeguards against the threats and vulnerabilities identified in the preceding two sections.
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