Military Implications of an SPS

PERIOD ABBREVIATION TIME Near-term N 1980‘s Mid-term M 1990's Far-term F 2000 and beyond Infeasible I Basic physical laws and scaling relationships indicate such a capability could never be constructed. We consider a threat as real or potentially real in a particular time period if it could be deployed then. This assessment will depend on the availability of any SPS elements needed to support the deployment and/or operation of the threat. The SPS Reference Design indicates that the first powersat and rectenna might be deployed in the year 2000. Other supporting elements of the SPS would be deployed sooner, from about 1995 on. Thus, threats which depend upon SPS elements for their actualization cannot become feasible, at the earliest, until the "M" time period. The availability of technology alone does not make a particular threat feasible. Even though a military goal could be accomplished using a particular technology , other methods may accomplish the same mission more cheaply and effectively, and/or with less risk. For example, POTVs or SVs could be used to inspect enemy satellites at close range. However, long-range space sensors might do this job almost as well for less cost, more covertly, and with less risk to personnel. We have indicated such potential but implausible threats by, for example, ”M but I", i.e., the technology to create the threat could be available in the "M" time period but the threat would not be implemented for other reasons. Such threats may thus be perceived by a casual observer, but are not credible on closer examination. The area of operation affects the feasibility of a proposed weapon directed at a particular target. For this study, three arenas for military encounters are relevant: Earth-to-space (ExS), space-to-Earth (SxE), and space-to-space (SxS). Here, "Earth" refers to ground-based or airborne weapons or targets. Ballistic misiles can have apogee altitudes of hundreds of kilometers. Thus we consider them as being located in LEO (except during the early phases of boost). The "space-to- space" areas refer to engagements where the attacker and target are in fairly close proximity, that is within 1000 kilometers of each other.

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