frequencies, and the complexity of orbital motions, it would require a massive undertaking to jam routine C3 functions of the SPS to a degree sufficient to cause disruption and confusion. At most, jamming could be expected to have some nuisance value in support of more direct attacks. Electronic equipment (especially digital processing equipment) can also be disrupted by saturation of its information processing capabilities. Thus a con- ceivable EW attack would attempt to overload C3 equipment by sending signals mimicking normal SPS communications signals, but at elevated bit rates on a continuous basis. Such an attack could succeed only if the receiving and processing systems were not very selective about message formats and bit rates, and if the attacker had detailed information about the design and operating characteristics 3 of the C systems. False information inserted into the C3 system (either by wiretaps into ground- based transmission lines, by clandestine insertion of "Trojan horse" electronic "black boxes" aboard space segments of the SPS, or by hostile transmitters sending such signals during a lull in normal SPS communications traffic) appears to offer a wide range of possibilities for disruption. Erroneous malfunction indications on the launch pad, for instance, could cause long holds during countdown. In some cases, this could cause a scheduled flight to miss its launch window, snarling launch schedules but it is difficult to see how this could imperil SPS crews in orbit or lead to massive physical damage to the system. False information transmitted by a "Pied Piper" box of sufficiently high power to override the normal pilot beam signal from the rectenna to the power satellite could cause the microwave beam to be aimed away from its assigned rectenna, but this would require successful espionage to determine the pilot beam message formats and the exact encryption algorithm used. Microwave signals from covertly emplaced transmitters around a rectenna could provide anomalously high microwave fluxes at sensors around the periphery of the rectenna, leading the phase control and transmission antenna steering system to believe that the power beam from the satellite had wandered off center.* The control system aboard the satellite might then shut down the power beam inappropriately. ♦This case is examined in detail in Appendix C.4. The hostile transmitters would have to have very high output levels, so they could not remain undetected for long.
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