Military Implications of an SPS

ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM A WORKING PAPER December 1980 Prepared by: J. Peter Valk, Principal Investigator Robert Salkeld, Principal Coauthor Richard D. Stutzke, Gerald W. Driggers and G. Harry Stine, Coauthors Science Applications, Inc. 1811 Santa Rita Road Pleasanton, California 94596 Prepared for: PRC Energy Analysis Company 7600 Old Springhouse Road McLean, Virginia 22102 Under Contract No. AC01—79ER10041 To: U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Research Satellite Power System Project Division Washington, D.C. 20545

Digitized by the Space Studies Institute -

ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM A WORKING PAPER December 1980 Prepared by: J. Peter Vajk Principal Investigator Robert Salkeld Principal Coauthor Richard D. Stutzke Gerald W. Driggers G. Harry Stine Coauthors Science Applications, Inc. 1811 Santa Rita Road Pleasanton, California 94596 Prepared for: PRC Energy Analysis Company 7600 Old Springhouse Road McLean, Virginia 22102 Under Contract No. AC01-79ER10041 to U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Research Satellite Power System Project Division Washington, D.C. 20545

Just as a person speaking in a language he has not fully mastered sometimes says things he did not intend, so policy can order things not in accord with its intention. This has happened often, and it is the lesson of history that a certain knowledge of military affairs is essential to the management of political matters. —Karl von Clausewitz— (Vom Kriege, 1830)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In view of the complexity of the subject of the military implications of the Satellite Power System, the authors of this report are indebted to many other people for sharing their expertise and experience in advanced technologies, international law, military doctrine, and national security policy. We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Tony W. Armstrong on particle beam weapons; Richard D. Binkowski on high energy lasers; Robert Bundgaard on weather modification; Charles W. Cates on rules of engagement and predelegated authority; Phil K. Chapman on laser propulsion and strategic uses of high energy lasers; K. Eric Drexler on advanced deep space propulsion, especially on high energy lasers; Marvin Leibstone on terrorism and insurgency; Phil K. Mitchell on electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures; E. Roland Parkinson on particle beam weapons; Delbert D. Smith on international law; Lewis J. Stecher on rules of engagement for defense of the SPS; William W. Stoner on optical target acquisition and tracking, especially using lidars; Donald W. Stribling on nuclear weapons effects; and Robert Widder on disarmament policy. This report has been considerably strengthened, in our view, by the efforts of a number of reviewers who carefully critiqued the first draft. We wish to thank Hubert Davis, Peter E. Glaser, Stanley G. Rosen, and Barry J. Smernoff for their comments and criticisms. Inevitably, we did not see eye-to-eye with our reviewers on all issues; they do not necessarily endorse all the views and findings presented in this report.

FOREWORD The Satellite Power System (SPS) is a potential energy technology for the turn of the century and beyond. This report on the military implications of the SPS is one of a large number of studies performed under the auspices of the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration which cover every major issue concerning the SPS concept. In the past few years, public awareness of the military implications of space technology has grown considerably. Thus the question of the potential military implications of the SPS has attracted a great deal of public discussion and debate. Could the power transmission beam from a power satellite be modified for use as a weapon? Given the huge size and the large investment required for each power satellite, wouldn’t they become highly attractive and vulnerable targets for attack by hostile countries or terrorists? Might the SPS represent a further escalation of an expensive armaments race into newer and more lethal means of destruction? This report provides a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the military implications of the SPS. Internationalization of ownership, management, and control for initial development of SPS may be feasible. Experience to date with large-scale international projects, however, suggests that funding difficulties and management and control questions (particularly when great sums of money are involved) might delay or even stifle development of the system. In addition, a number of salient U.S. foreign policy concerns, including technology transfer and dependence on foreign energy sources, would tend to weaken arguments for internationalization. Therefore, although this study addresses multinational program arrangements and implications, the preponderant orientation is toward a unilateral United States program.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acknowledgements iii Foreward iv Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms xi 1 .0 INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 1-1 1.1 Background and Motivation for this Study 1-1 1.2 Scenarios for SPS Programs 1-2 1.3 Assumptions 1-5 1.4 Methods of Approach 1-8 1.5 Conclusions 1-11 2 .0 SYSTEMS DEFINITIONS 2-1 2.1 Transportation 2-1 2.2 Low Earth Orbit Base 2-5 2.3 Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Base 2-7 2.4 Power Satellites 2-8 2.5 Rectenna 2 2-12 2.6 Command and Control (C ) System 2-13 2.7 Communications System 2-18 2.8 References 2-19 3 .0 THREAT ANALYSIS 3-1 3.1 Methodology 3-1 3.2 Potential Uses of the Reference Design Satellite 3-2 3.2.1 Force Delivery 3 3-4 3.2.2 Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C I) 3-10 3.2.3 Military Support 3-13 3.3 Institutional Threats 3-16 3.4 Credibility of Threats 3-17 3.5 Threat/Safeguard Matrix 3-19 3.6 Summary 3-20 3.7 References and Notes 3-21 4 .0 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 4-1 4.1 Methodology 4-1 4.2 Generic Types of Assaults 4-2 4.3 Scenarios for Assaults Against SPS 4-5 4.4 Technological Vulnerabilities 4-6 4.4.1 Physical Contact 4-7 4.4.2 Standoff Weapons 4-9 4.4.3 Electronic Warfare 4-12 4.4.4 Chaff Deployment 4-14 4.5 Vulnerabilities of Specific SPS Elements 4-15 4.5.1 The Transportation Systems 4-15 4.5.2 The LEO Base 4-16 4.5.3 The GEO Base 4-16

4.5.4 Power Satellites 4-16 4.5.5 Rectenna 4-17 4.5.6 Command, Control and Communications System 4-17 4.6 Misperceptions Concerning the SPS Vulnerabilities 4-17 4.7 Vulnerability/Safeguard Matrix 4-18 4.8 Comparative Vulnerability of the Satellite Power System 4-24 4.9 Summary 4-26 4.10 References 4-27 5 .0 SAFEGUARD ANALYSIS 5-1 5.1 Technological Safeguards 5-2 5.2 Institutional Safeguards 5-6 5.3 Key Safeguards 5-7 5.4 International Resident Inspection Operation (RIO) 5-10 5.5 Summary 5-13 Appendix A. Guidelines for Resident Inspection Operations (RIO) A-l A.l General Consideration A-l A.2 Institutional Arrangements of RIO A-2 A.3 Operational Considerations A-4 A.4 Conclusion A-7 Appendix B. Multilateral Agreements Regarding Military Implications of SPS B-l B.l Types of Multilateral Agreements B-l B.2 Concerns for SPS Multilateral Treaties B-4 B.2.1 Negotiating Positions B-5 B.2.2 Selected Provisions B-6 B.3 Reference and Notes B-9 Appendix C. Technological Background Papers C-l C.l Nuclear Weapon Effects on Satellite Power Systems C.l-2 C.l.l Basic Nuclear Effects of Concern C.l-2 C.l.2 Typical Space System Vulnerability Levels C.l-4 C.l.3 Protecting SPS Elements Against Nuclear Weapon Effects C.l-7 C.l,4 Summary C.l-10 C.2 Particle Beam Weapons (PBW) and SPS C.2-1 C.2.1 General Character of Spaceborne PBW Systems C.2-1 C.2.2 Basic Exoatmospheric PBW Lethality Considerations C.2-2 C.2.3 Safeguards/Countermeasures C.2-4 C.2.4 Summary C.2-5 C.2.5 References C.2-6 C.3 High Energy Lasers and SPS C.3-1 C.3.1 System Description C.3-1 C.3.2 Performance Assessment C.3-3

C.3.3 Strategic Use of the SPS Laser System C.3-6 C.3.4 SPS Vulnerability to HEL C.3-6 C.3.5 Implementation C.3-9 C.3.6 Safeguards C.3-9 C.3.7 References and Notes C.3-11 C.4 Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) C.4-1 C.4.1 The SPS as an EW Weapon/Platform C.4-1 C.4.2 EW Threats to the SPS C.4-2 C.4.3 EW and SPS Self-Protection C.4-8 C.4.4 References C.4-9 C.5 Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) and SPS C.5-1 C.5.1 CBW Vulnerability C.5-1 C.5.2 CBW Threats C.5-2 C.6 Weather Modification as an Auxiliary Role for SPS C.6-1 C.6.1 Feasibility C.6-1 C.6.2 Possible Other Effects of Microwave Transmission C.6-4 C.6.3 References C.6-5

LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1-1 Summary of Key Issues Identified in Previous Studies 1-3 2-1 SPS System and Subsystem Elements 2-2 2-2 Reference SPS Transportation Systems and Operations 2-4 3-1 Possible Military Adapters for SPS 3-4 3-2 Uses of Force Delivery Devices 3-9 3 3-3 Uses of C I Devices and Facilities 3-12 3-4 Uses of Military Support Devices 3-15 3-5 Institutional Threats 3-16 3-6 Ear th-to-Space Threats 3-23 3-7 Space-to-Earth Threats 3-24 3-8 Space-to-Space Threats 3-25 3-9 Threat/Safeguards Matrix for the SPS 3-27 4-1 Possible Technological Means of Assault Against SPS 4-8 4-2 Common Misperceptions Regarding SPS Vulnerability 4-19 4-3 Vulnerability/Safeguards Matrix for the SPS 4-20 5-1 Technological Safeguards for SPS 5-3 5-2 Institutional Safeguards for SPS 5-6 5-3 SPS Safeguard Summary 5-8 5-4 Principal Safeguards 5-9 A-l RIO Manning Requirements A-5 C.l-1 Estimated Vulnerability Thresholds C.l-6 C.l-2 Transient Short Circuit Current (I$c) Induced in Two Typical Cells (x and y) by Ionizing Radiation at High Transient Dose Rates C.l-7

C.2-1 Nominal PBW Parameter Summary C.2-2 C.2-2 PBW Lethality Mechanisms Summary C.2-5 C.3-1 Power Satellite-Based Laser Performance (Nominal) C.3-4 C.3-2 Power Satellite-Based Laser Performance (Optimistic) C.3-4 C.3-3 Earth-to-GEO Performance C.3-5 C.3-4 Short Wavelength Coupling Coefficients C.3-5 C.3-5 Solar Cell Equilibrium Temperature as a Function of Incident Irradiance C.3-10 C.4-1 Representative Chaff Attentuation Path Geometry C.4-5 C.4-2 "Worst Case" Chaff Deployment Against the SPS Pilot Beam C.4-7

3 2-1 Command, Control and Communications (C ) System for the SPS During Routine Construction and Operation Phase of the SPS Program 2-14 C.2-1 Block Diagram of a Conceptual Exoatmospheric Particle Beam Weapon (PBW) System C.2-3 C.3-1 An Electric Discharge Laser (EDL) for Space. A Closed-Cycle Subsonic-Gas-Flow System C.3-2 C.3-2 HEL System Weight C.3-2 C.3-3 HEL System Volume C.3-2

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ABM Ballistic missile defense ABRES Aeroballistic Reentry Systems AC Alternating current AC ASAT carrier ACS Attitude control system ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone Agr. International agreement(s) ALS Alternate launch site ASAT Antisatellite weapon BCI Baggage and cargo inspection BMD Ballistic missile defense BT Booby trap C^ Communications C3 Command and control C^ Command, control, and communications C I Command, control, communications, and intelligence CBW Chemical/biological warfare CDEP (SPS) Concept Development and Evaluation Program CE+I Counterespionage and intelligence CIA Central Intelligence Agency CMOS Complementary metal oxide semiconductor C0_ Carbon dioxide COMINT Electronic intelligence to analyze a communications network (See also ELINT and SIGINT) Comm. Communications COMSAT Communications Satellite Corporation (U.S.) CONUS Airspace over the continental U.S. COTV Cargo orbital transfer vehicle CW Continuous wave (Applied to a transmitter, this term implies continuous rather than pulsed operation.) DB Direct broadcast DC Direct current DDT&E Design, development, test, and engineering DEW Directed energy weapons DF Deuterium flour ide DK Dual key enabling system DOD U.S. Department of Defense DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOS U.S. Department of State DRMR Satellite deployment, replacement, maintenance, or repair △V ("delta- Maneuvering to change orbit or trajectory; magnitude of change in vee") orbital velocity

e Electrons (Negatively charged particles.) EB Earth bombardment ECM Electronic countermeasures EC/LSS Environmental control and life support system EDL Electric discharge laser EEC European Economic Community (Common Market) ELF Extremely low frequency radio signals ELINT Electronic intelligence to analyze characteristics of a transmitter, especially radar (See also COMINT and SIGINT) EMP Electromagnetic pulse (specifically, from a nuclear explosion) EOB Electronic order of battle ER Earth irradiation ESA European Space Agency EW Electronic Warfare FAA Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCS Fire control system FEL Free electron laser FOBS Fractional-orbit bombardment system GEO Geosynchronous Earth orbit GFRTP Graphite fibe^ reinforced thermoplastic GHz Gigaherts (10 cycles per second) GNP Gross National Product GPS Global Positioning System GW Gigawatt (109 watts) y Gamma rays H+ Positive hydrogen ions Hard. Hardening HE Conventional high explosives HEL High energy laser HF Hydrogen flour ide HF High frequency HFDF High frequency direction finder HLLV Heavy lift launch vehicle ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Organization IR Infrared IS Industrial security measures ITU International Telecommunications Union 3 keV 10 electron volts kV Kilovolt kW Kilowatt

LANDSAT Earth resources satellite LEO Low Earth orbit LOS Line-of-sight LPRE Laser-powered rocket engine LRSS (Comprehensive) long-range space surveillance LTV Lunar transfer vehicle MAD Mutual assured destruction MCC Mission control center MDRE Mass driver reaction engine MeV 10b electron volts MHD Magnetohydrodynamics MHz Megahertz MOS Metal oxide semiconductor MR Maintenance and repair MUF Maximum usable frequencies mW Milliwatt MW Megawatt prad Microradian (10 radian) n Neutrons NaK Sodium/potassium, used as a coolant NASA U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAV Navigation NAVSTAR U.S. (military) navigation satellite system NCA National Command Authority NEARSAT Hostile satellite maintained close to a given satellite or space station NORAD North American Air Defense Command NTM Nonterrestrial materials NTMV "National technical means of verification" (SALT euphemism for surveillance and reconnaissance satellites) OAS Organization of American States 01 Orbital interceptor O&M Operations and maintenance 0-0 Orbit-to-orbit OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OTEC Ocean thermal energy conversion OTV Orbital transfer vehicle PBW Particle beam weapon PLV Personnel launch vehicle PM Personnel management POTV Personnel orbital transfer vehicle PRC People's Republic of China Prox. International agreements on proximity rules in space

PS Personnel screening and selection procedures Psychwar Psychological warfare Pub. ed. Public education (to counter misperceptions and deliberate misinformation) R&D Research and development Red. obs. Reduced observables RF Radio frequency RFI Radio frequency interference RIO (International) Resident Inspection Organization ROE Rules of engagement RV Reentry vehicles 3 S Shelter, supplies, and services S&R Surveillance and reconnaissance SAC U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SAM Surface-to-air missile SATMUT Damage or mutilation of a satellite by grapplers SATNAP Seizure ("kidnapping") of a satellite SD Self-destruction SDF Self-defense SGEMP System-generated electromagnetic pulse SIGINT Electronic intelligence, generically (See also COMINT and ELINT.) SMAT Sabotage, mutiny, attack, and/or terrorism SMF Space manufacturing facility SOLARES Space Orbiting Light Augmentation Reflector Energy System SPS Satellite Power System SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine SSTO Single-stage-to-orbit vehicle SV Sortie vehicle T Metric ton (1000 kilograms) TREE Transient radiation environment effects UHF Ultrahigh frequency UN, UNO United Nations Organization UV Ultraviolet VHF Very high frequency VLF Very low frequency VTOHL Vertical-takeoff, horizontal-landing WXM Weather modification XMTR Transmitter

1 .0 INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 1.1 Background and Motivation for this Study The concept of harvesting renewable solar energy in space for transmission to Earth for terrestrial use has attracted increasing interest and study in recent years. Satellite Power Systems (*SPS) were first proposed in 1968 by Peter E. Glaser as a possible long-term solution for the world’s future energy needs. The continued advancement of solid state technology, space technology, and materials science in general, combined with more urgent attention to the energy issues in the political arena, have made the SPS concept more attractive and perhaps nearer in time than was the case in 1968. * A glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in this report appears near the front of this volume. ** References for each section of this report are included at the end of the section. If a Satellite Power System such as is described in the NASA Reference Design R*e*port were to be undertaken to provide significant quantities of power to the United States and perhaps to other countries as well, significant military implications would ensue. These would arise, first, from the possible uses of such satellites and supporting systems (perhaps with enhanced military capabilities) as weapons or as supportive elements of other military systems (threat issues) and, second, from the necessity of ensuring the security of such important economic assets in space (vulnerability issues). Questions about the military implications of an SPS program arise regardless of which nation or group of nations deploys such satellites. The specific details of the questions raised would vary, but the underlying questions of threat, vulnerability and means of safeguarding the program would remain just as important. These questions about the military implications of an SPS program are very important domestically as well as internationally. Should power satellites prove to be economically, technologically, and environmentally desirable as new sources of power for the United States, their political acceptability would depend on satisfactory resolution of some of these questions concerning the possible mili- tary uses (or misuses) of SPS or its supporting and implementing program. The principal aim of the present study is to investigate means by which convincing

assurances could be provided during implementation of an SPS program and during routine operations of a network of power satellites that the system is NOT being used, overtly or covertly, for military purposes and that the system is no more vulnerable to attack than more conventional electrical power sources. Under the auspices of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) SPS Concept Development and Evaluation Program (CDEP), these military implications questions were studied briefly in 1978. Table 1-1 lists the possible threat and vulnerability issues which were identified in those two studies, and possible methods of forestalling any real concerns about military uses of power satellites. In this study, these and additional issues have been addressed in greater depth and breadth to develop specific proposals of safeguards for the SPS. 1.2 Scenarios for SPS Programs Any discussion of the military implications of Satellite Power Systems must recognize that the research and development effort and the construction and operation of power satellites will not be carried out as a single, monolithic project. During different phases of an overall program spanning fifty years or more, different types of organizations will be involved in a variety of roles, each interacting with different sets of actors on the national and international scenes in diverse arrangements having significantly different military, political, and social implications. Five distinct phases can be identified in an overall program geared to commercial* operation of a significant number of solar power satellites. First, the research and development (R&D) phase may last up to ten years to prove the validity of the SPS concept and to provide a reasonably high degree of confidence that the following phases will be successful. If the R&D effort continues to demonstrate the viability and desirability of SPS, a commitment could be made to proceed toward SPS deployment by initiating an eight to ten year design, development, test, and engineering (DDT&E) phase, possibly overlapping the R&D phase. (The Reference System report^ assumes this phase would run from the late 1980’s to the late 1990’s.) * In this context, we use the term "commercial" to mean widespread use in commerce, not to imply that SPS will be (or should be) exclusively a private sector affair.

Table 1-1. SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN PREVIOUS STUDIES REAL OR PERCEIVED THREATS SPS AS A WEAPON Power for beam weapons used as ABM Power for beam weapons used as ASAT Power for beam weapons used as incendiary device Microwave beam used as psychological weapon against enemy troops Microwave beam used to disable or degrade enemy satellites by overheating Microwave beam used for hostile weather modification SPS AS A SUPPORT SYSTEM Power for remote military installations Power for other military satellites Laser power transmission to allow military aircraft indefinite loiter times at high altitudes SPS as platform for: Manned inspection of other satellites Repair and maintenance of military satellites Advanced sensor systems for surveillance and early warning Alternate communications channels using laser or microwave power transmission beams Advanced military navigations sytsems Electronic jamming techniques Meteorological, geographic, and geological mapping ELF communications link to submarines Civilian use of SPS power to free up portable fuels for military use REAL OR PERCEIVED VULNERABILITIES Sabotage during on-orbit assembly phase Sabotage during orbital operations Sensitivity of solar cells to radiation from nuclear explosives Sensitivity of life support systems for personnel on SPS to overt military assault Seizure of control of pilot beam by insurgency or sabotage at receiver array on the ground Disruption of pilot or control signals by insugency or sabotage Rectenna becomes a key military target in time of war RF interference with enemy military systems may provide excuse for action against SPS in time of hostilities SAFEGUARDS Hardening of critical electronic components Self-defense of satellite segment by beam weapons Internationalization of entire program

If the DDT&E phase runs smoothly, commitment to proceed with SPS construction on a commercial scale would require a four-year startup phase of procurement and deployment of launch facilities, launch vehicles, orbit-to-orbit vehicles, and space bases. Extensive launch and orbital operations would be involved in this phase, including major expansions of launch facilities. In the fourth phase, routine production of several power satellites and rectennas would take place each year. In the Reference System, two units of 5 GW electrical output would be completed each year until a total of sixty 5 GW units are in place. A fifth phase, decommissioning the entire system, is presumed to lie far in the future and has not been considered in this study. Most of the effort in this study focused on the third and fourth phases of the overall SPS program. It is also necessary to consider three distinct phases in the life cycle of a particular power satellite and rectenna: (1) the construction phase, when the power satellite and rectenna are being built; (2) the routine operations and maintenance (O&M) phase, lasting through the useful lifetime of a power satellite and rectenna, which is expected to be thirty years or more; (3) the decommissioning phase, when further repairs or modifications of the power satellite and/or rectenna are no longer economically advantageous, and the power satellite and/or rectenna is shut down and scrapped or salvaged for totally different purposes. (Note that the power satellite and the rectenna might be decommissioned at different times.) From the viewpoint of an individual power satellite and rectenna, we have considered only the first two phases in this study since the third phase lies too far in the future, although decommissioning could have significant military implications. Various types of organizational arrangements for the different phases of an overall SPS program have been discussed in previous studies. Obviously, the nature and national composition of the legal entities controlling, financing, owning, managing, or operating various segments of a Satellite Power System will have important effects on perceptions of threats posed by SPS and on perceptions of vulnerabilities of SPS.

The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) has been suggested as a model for international arrangements for SPS. Whatever the relative merits of setting up an analogous international arrangement for SPS, it is necessary for the purposes of examining the military implications of SPS to focus attention elsewhere, not on the legal entity or entities controlling, funding, and managing the DDT&E, startup, and routine construction and operations phases of the program. Our focus here will be on the operational entities which design, build, and maintain the power satellites and which design, control, and operate the launch facilities, the launch vehicles, the orbital bases in low Earth orbit and in geosynchronous Earth orbit, the orbital transfer vehicles, and any other facilities in space. This focus on the operational organizations results from the following considerations: (1) These operational entities will have continuous "hands on" access to space vehicles and space facilities, including the power satellites themselves, from DDT&E through decommissioning, whether or not they own these devices. Therefore these entities will be in a unique position to be co-opted by military interests of their own national government(s) or of the government(s) of allied nation(s), and to covertly deploy military adaptors for the SPS. (2) These entities will have primary responsibility for implementing any technological means for reducing or eliminating vulnerabilities of the power satellites and other SPS elements in space. Thus these organizations would be in a unique position to be subverted in such a manner as to increase the vulnerability of the power satellites and other system elements, or to install "Trojan horse" devices aboard power satellites to be sold to other countries which would permit disabling the power satellite upon command of a hostile entity at a later date. Short of thorough audit and inspection procedures by other organizations, it is difficult to see how legal and institutional arrangements analogous to those of INTELSAT, per se, could provide protection against the dangers suggested above. 1.3 Assumptions The subject of the military implications of a Satellite Power System planned for deployment in the period 20 to 50 years in the future is vast. Certain assumptions had to be made to guide the directions of inquiry, to limit the scope of the problem, and to provide a background context for the SPS program. The assumptions

of this study are discussed in this section. In some instances, consideration was given briefly to alternative possibilities where our assumptions might be considered controversial or where interesting differences in implications could be expected. 1. Civilian Nature of the Program. We have assumed that the national policy decision by the United States to participate in a full-scale SPS program is motivated by the nation's domestic need for energy rather than by strategic considerations regarding national defense. Under this assumption, SPS is considered to be designed as a civilian system only. The U.S. portions of the program are then operated by the private sector, by civilian branches of the government, or by some combination of these. (See References 6 and 7 for discussions of possible financing and management alternatives for SPS.) In case of a national emergency, however, equipment and facilities owned by U.S. entities may come under direct control of, or even direct use by, the National Command Authorities, as is the case today for certain major private sector activities such as the commercial airlines. 2. U.S. Role in the SPS Program. Although substantial interest has been expressed in the SPS concept by government and business leaders in many other countries, most of the R&D effort on SPS to date has been provided by the United States. Should the R&D program conclude that it is definitely worth pursuing the DDT&E phase, we have assumed that the United States would be among the first to make a significant committment to that phase. Once a system for construction of power satellites is in place (following completion of the startup phase), power satellites built by the United States and its partners could be sold, leased, or otherwise made available to nonparticipating countries on a commercial basis or on an international development aid basis. We do not assume that power satellites would be owned and operated exclusively by the United States. (The Reference Design report assumes that power satellites are built by the U.S. solely for domestic energy production.) Many of the military issues of SPS would seem to be largely moot if the operational entities for SPS were fully multilateral from the very beginning of the DDT&E phase (if not sooner). It is certainly a more difficult task to devise means to defuse the military issues of threat and vulnerability for a unilateral SPS program. For the purpose of this study, then, we have focused our attention on this most difficult case; an internationalized SPS would certainly be easier to safeguard in a manner acceptable to most national governments.

3. Utility Ownership of Power Satellites and Rectennas. We have assumed that, upon completion of construction of a power satellite and rectenna, the SPS construction organization(s) will sell them outright to utility companies or government agencies, whether in the United States or abroad, rather than retaining ownership of the hardware and selling the power. Once a power satellite and rectenna is sold outright to a foreign entity, the SPS construction entity would have no further control over it, although the builders may continue to provide maintenance and repair services to the owners on a contract basis, as is the case today for the builders of nuclear powerplants. While the U.S. commitment to participation in building power satellites may be purely civilian in nature, the same cannot be assumed for all foreign purchasers of power satellites. Given this assumption of ownership of power satellites and ancillary facilities by many different nations, it is perhaps even more difficult to provide credible safeguards against military adaptations of portions of the SPS than if only one nation (e.g., the United States) owned such facilities. It will clearly be necessary to look outside the operational entities for means to assure the nonmilitary nature of SPS elements, and additional actors (including utility companies, foreign owners, and national governments abroad) must also be considered in devising safeguards for SPS. 4. Plural Presence in Space. In the time period after about 1990, we assume the presence in space of spacecraft and personnel from many nations, not just the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Both the People's Republic of China and Japan have declared their intentions of achieving manned capabilities in space by the end of the century. At least another dozen countries will have the capability of launching satellites to LEO and GEO in the late 1980's and 1990's. One or more private enterprise ventures (such as OTRAG in West Germany) are likely to succeed in bringing new launch vehicles into operational use by that time. Extensive manned operations in space imply the possible access of terrorists to space systems as well as to ground facilities, especially if the costs of • transportation become low enough (less than $20-40 per kilogram) to permit development of space tourism. Such tourists-turned-terrorists, however, would have to be technically highly trained to be very effective.

5. Diffusion of Advanced Technologies. In discussing the potential threats which the SPS could wield under a United States program, we made projections of certain technologies to obtain some idea of the capabilities space weaponry may achieve in the next 20 to 50 years. Over such a time span, we must assume that anything which U.S. technology could devise will be matched by that of other countries, with no more than a few years delay. 6. Normal Technology Growth. While unimaginable breakthroughs could occur in the next fifty years, leading to whole new transporation systems, communications systems, and weapons systems, we have assumed that anything actually deployable in the next five decades will already exist today, at least in conceptual form with a reasonable technical basis. We thus admit high energy lasers, laser propulsion, and microelectronic technologies advanced by several orders of magnitude in capability beyond those available today. 1.4 Method of Approach Threat and vulnerability, whether potentially real or only imagined because of some misperceptions, are the most basic of considerations in assessing military implications of the SPS concept. That some threat possibilities can be perceived rather than real is shown by the common misconception about the Reference Design that if the microwave power beam to the ground were to wander away from its designated receiver antenna array (rectenna), it would leave in its wake countless "cooked" people, wildlife, and vegetation, along with "scorched" cities should it cross any. (Such misconceptions can only be countered by public discussion about SPS.) More realistic threats include the addition of directed energy weapons (either laser or particle beam devices) to the power satellite, or substitution of laser power transmission for microwave power transmission to the ground. The possibility that a network of SPS facilities was being covertly equipped with a high energy laser ballistic missile defense (ABM) system of high efficiency would be viewed with considerable alarm by any other nation whose strategic military doctrine depended heavily on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). On the vulnerability side, the right of free passage in space of vehicles launched by states which are parties to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon

and Other Celestial Bodies could be invoked to allow a hostile or potentially hostile nation to deploy NEARSATs ("killer" satellites or even remotely controlled mines) in close proximity to a solar power satellite. The actual degree of military involvement in an SPS program will naturally have a significant impact on threat and vulnerability issues. Any source of energy, of course, plays an indirect supporting role in national security and military preparedness. Such use of the SPS would not be considered directly military, unless the receiver antenna arrays were located predominantly or exclusively on military bases or defense-oriented installations such as uranium enrichment plants. Conversely, should each power satellite be equipped with long-range beam weapons, or with additional electronic equipment permitting the use of the microwave transmitting array as a deep space surveillance radar, or with laser communications equipment permitting the SPS to act as a relay to and from military communications, reconnaissance, or surveillance satellites, the significance of the SPS as a target for attack in time of hostilities would be altered drastically as might the ability of the SPS to protect itself from certain types of attacks. We must thus consider, at a minimum, the two extreme cases of a SPS with enhanced military capabilities and of a SPS with minimized military support capabilities. Once the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a SPS have been developed, various methods of safeguarding the system must be developed, and it is the aim of this study to identify and discuss potential safeguards. Safeguards in the most general sense could include preventive measures (i.e., action taken to forestall concerns about SPS threats and to inhibit other nations or terrorist groups from attacking the SPS) and neutralizing measures (i.e., actions taken to allow the SPS to survive attack, or to prevent an SPS with enhanced military capabilities from using those capabilities for aggression.) Safeguards can be purely technological (such as hardening of electronic components against radiation from nuclear explosions, laser beams, particle beams, or induced surge currents), or institutional (such as international treaties on just how close space vehicles or satellites of different nations may come to one another without prior mutual consent). The vulnerability and threat issues associated with SPS are to a significant extent shaped by the hardware itself. A thorough analysis of military implications then requires consideration of all the factors mentioned above with respect to each

of the major systems and subsystems of the SPS. Insofar as enhanced military capabilities may be added to the system, such military capabilities must also be considered as major system and subsystem elements of SPS in the analysis. For each subsystem element, we consider the specific threats that element could pose to ground or space systems of another nation, including both technological and institutional means afforded by the SPS. For each threat posed by a subsystem, one or more safeguards are identified and examined. We then consider for each subsystem element of the SPS (but not of military adapters to the SPS) the specific ways in which a threat could be deployed against it by a hostile institutional means. Again, for each such vulnerability of the SPS or any subelement, one or more safeguards are identified and examined. This analysis results in two matrices, one of threats and safeguards versus subsystem elements of the SPS, with and without military adapters; the other, of vulnerabilities and safeguards versus subsystem elements of the SPS itself, without military adapters. (It is not within the scope of this study to consider the vulnerabilities of military hardware which might be attached to SPS elements.) The study approach, then, is as follows: (1) Define the system and subsystem elements of the SPS and of military adapters which might be added to it, either overtly or covertly. (2) Examine likely technological developments in key areas over the next twenty to fifty years (when the Reference Design SPS is assumed to be deployed) to permit definition of likely threats or vulnerabilities of SPS elements. (3) Element by element, examine the applicability of these technologies to providing the SPS with significant military capabilities or to providing hostile forces with means of attacking SPS elements. Using the same data base, examine possible safeguards against each potentially real threat or vulnerability identified. The system and subsystem elements of the SPS for the purposes of this study are described in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the threat issues we have identified and considered. Section 4 discusses the vulnerability issues, primarily of the Reference Design, with occasional comments on differences in vulnerabilities among alternative SPS designs. Section 5 then identifies and analyzes safeguards against the threats and vulnerabilities identified in the preceding two sections.

Appendix A discusses the Resident Inspection Operations at greater length. Appendix B discusses some multilateral agreements which bear on the military implications of SPS. Appendix C discusses a variety of technical topics, including technological projections in some key areas. 1.5 Conclusions Several principles and themes have emerged in this study: (1) Military implications clearly depend on the arrangements under which one or more nations pursue the implementation of a SPS program. It could be conducted as a unilateral program, a multilateral program including only friendly partners, or a multilateral program, including potential adversaries. Military implications further depend on whether SPS development and operation is monitored by international resident inspection operations. (2) The Unmodified Reference Resign SPS has no capability for military force delivery or for military CI functions. It does have some modest military support capabilities. Most significant here is the inherent capacity of the system to transport large quantities of equipment and large numbers of people (compared to present standards) between the surface of the Earth and high Earth orbit (past GEO, at least). The detailed nature of military activities in space which could then be carried out independent of the rest of SPS is beyond the scope of this study. Power satellites, the LEO base, the GEO base, and many of the vehicles used for SPS could all be used as platforms for various communications, reconnaissance, and surveillance functions. These facilities and vehicles could also be used to support maintenance and repair of military satellites and vehicles. (3) Weapons modules having tactical and strategic significance could be added to a Satellite Power System. The more significant military capabilities which could be added are as follows: a) A ballistic missile defense (ABM) system based on directed energy weapons (DEW’s), most likely high energy lasers. Depending on the rate of technological advance, such weapons might ultimately achieve the capability of neutralizing low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles. Unilateral deployment of such a system could be considered provocative by other nations. On the other hand, with proper safeguards, multilateral deployment of such defensive systems could be internationally stabilizing. b) A variety of antisatellite (ASAT) systems. These could include DEW’s, space-to-space missiles (either rockets or projectiles), space mines, and grapplers (either manned or remotely operated). Except for DEW’s and small projectile weapons, a comprehensive space surveillance system should be able to detect and track such weapons, making it difficult to attack without warning. c) Reentry vehicles for Earth bombardment with either conventional high explosives or nuclear warheads. Although it would be difficult

to defend against such weapons, comprehensive space surveillance should be able to detect such vehicles upon launch. Any foreseeable non-nuclear weapons which could be added to SPS would be less threatening than the strategic nuclear arsenals already deployed on Earth. (4) C3I modules having tactical and strategic significance could be added to a Satellite Power System but would require engineering modifications. The most significant such additions which are unique to SPS (due to the availability of large quantities of electrical power) are EW jammers and direct broadcast to the population of a hostile country. (5) The power satellites could be used as a power source (with laser transmission) for military satellites or to allow long-duration flight of military aricraft at high altitudes. (6) The power satellites themselves, in the Reference Design SPS, are vulnerable to system-generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) effects resulting from the gamma-ray and x-ray emissions of nuclear explosions. Use of nuclear weapons for this purpose, however, may result in damage ranging from slight to extensive to other spacecraft (including those of the attacker) at comparable range from the explosion. The Reference Design was not intended to consider these vulnerabilities, and it may be possible to incorporate adequate hardening features. Various design alternatives for SPS may be less sensitive or may be more easily hardened against this threat. (7) The various system and subsystem elements of the SPS are vulnerable to a variety of types of attack, but are inherently no more vulnerable than existing elements of the civilian economic infrastructure, including electrical generating plants, petroleum refineries, electrical power transmission and distribution networks, pipeline systems, railroads, aircraft and airports, and communications networks. The survivability of each system and subsystem element is sensitive to design details and survivability considerations for SPS would be integrated with other engineering design and program management design from the start. (8) Military implications of SPS are concept dependent. Therefore, appraisal of the military implications of SPS generically requires that alternative SPS system concepts be evaluated to the same depth as the photovoltaic SPS Reference Design considered in the bulk of this study. (9) Certain issues have been raised about the capability of a Satellite Power System to effect military force delivery or to survive military attack. Several of these issues are based on misperceptions about the SPS concept. These misperceptions may be overcome, but only if discussions about SPS are carried on in an atmosphere of openness and candor. (10) Numerous safeguards have been identified against the threats which a SPS with enhanced military capabilities might pose to other countries, and

against vulnerabilities to which the SPS might be prone. Although no single safeguard or combination of safeguards can totally assure that the SPS will not pose a threat to anyone—anymore than it is possible to assure that the SPS will be survivable to attack by anyone—it seems likely that several of these safeguards could be combined to reduce the threat potential to acceptable levels. The credibility of such safeguards, again, depends on candid public discussions. (11) Certain safeguards appear to offer the most promise. These include an international Resident Inspection Operation (RIO), a comprehensive Long- Range Space Surveillance (LRSS) system, system design for survivability, and a variety of new international agreements. Self-defensive armaments for major elements of the SPS, and various electronic countermeasures to protect SPS elements from electronic attack are other useful safeguards. The need for these latter two safeguards obviously would vary in importance depending on the arrangements under which one or more nations conduct a SPS program, as noted in (1) above. (12) If a Resident Inspection Operation for SPS can be established successfully, it could provide a stabilizing influence in international affairs. In summary, this examination of the military implications of a Satellite Power System has revealed no threat issues which cannot be mitigated by a judicious combination of safeguards. 1.6 References and Notes 1. "Satellite Power System: Reference System Report," DOE/ER-0023, DOE/NASA, January 1979. 2. Arrie Bachrach, "Satellite Power System: Public Acceptance," HCP/R-4024-04, DOE/NASA, October 1978. 3. "Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program Plan, July 1977 - August 1980," DOE/ET-0034, February 1978. 4. Claud N. Bain, "Satellite Power System: Military Implications," HCP/R-4024- 11, DOE/NASA, October 1978. 5. Michael J. Ozeroff, "Satellite Power System: Military Implications," HCP/R- 4024-01, DOE/NASA, October 1978. 6. J. Peter Vajk, "Satellite Power System: Financial/Management Scenarios," HCP/R-4024-05, DOE/NASA, October 1978. 7. Herbert E. Kierulff, "Satellite Power Systems: Financial/Management Scenarios," HCP/R-4024-13, DOE/NASA, October 1978.

8. Henry G. Elder, "Satellite Power System: An Overview of Prospective Organizational Structures in the Solar Power Satellite Field," TID-29094, DOE/NASA, October 1978. 9. "First Private Launch Vehicle Successful," The Foundation Institute Report 1(1), 1-2 (September 1977). 10. Krafft A. Ehricke, "Space Industrial Productivity: New Options for the Future," pp. 66-245 in Vol. II Future Space Programs 1975, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, September 1975. 11. Krafft, A. Ehricke, "Extraterrestrial Imperative," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pp. 18-26, November 1971. 12. William P. Gilbreath and Kenneth W. Billman, "A Search for Space Energy Alternatives," in: Radiation Energy Conversion in Space, Kenneth W. Billman, ed., Vol. 61, Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, New York, 1978. 13. Claud N. Bain, "Potential of Laser for SPS Power Transmission," HCP/R-4024- 07, DOE/NASA, October 1978. 14. Claud N. Bain, "Power From Space by Laser," Astronautics and Aeronautics, 17(3), 28-40, (March 1979). 15. Maxwell W. Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry," October 31, 1977, 3165 La Mesa Drive, San Carlos, California 94070. 16. Article I of the treaty states: The exploration and use of outer space... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries... and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. The full text of the Treaty on Principles appears as Appendix A in Carl Q. Christol, "Satellite Power Systems (SPS): International Agreements," HCP/R- 4024-08, DOE/NASA, October 1978.

2.0 SYSTEM DEFINITION The breakdown of SPS into system and subsystem elements presented below differs somewhat from other SPS documentation. We have, however, used the NASA Reference System Report for basic information on the Reference Design whenever possible. The Reference Design SPS was divided into seven major systems: (1) transportation system; (2) low Earth orbit (LEO) base; (3) geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) base; (4) power satellites themselves; (5) receiver antenna arrays (rectennas) and associated facilities on the ground; (6) command and control system; and (7) communications system. In general, whenever we refer to "SPS" or "Satellite Power System" in this report, we mean the entire system including all of the above elements. If we refer to just the power satellites themselves, we use the term "power satellite." As discussed in Section 1.4 before, it is necessary to consider two extreme cases: a SPS with enhanced military capabilities, and a SPS with minimized military support capabilities.(The Reference Design SPS represents the latter case.) To enhance the military usefulness of SPS, various adapters or modules would be added to, or incorporated into, SPS elements in order to carry out any of the three major missions of military organizations: (1) force delivery; (2) command, con- trol, communications, and intelligence (C3I); and (3) military support. A Satellite Power System with fully enhanced military capabilities would then have ten major systems, namely, the seven listed above for the Reference Design, plus adapters for each of the three major military missions just mentioned. These ten systems and their refinements into subsystem elements are shown in Table 2-1. Each of the system elements of the Reference Design in Table 2-1 will be described briefly in this section. We defer discussion of military systems and subsystems which might be added to SPS until Section 3. 2.1 Transportation Systems Brief descriptions of SPS transportation systems and operations are given here. A more quantitative summary of transportation parameters is presented in Table 2-2 which views the program at the midpoint of total system buildup, that is, when thirty 5 GW units are in place and operational, and construction is proceeding